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The Jurisprudence of Prevention: The 
Right of Societal Self-Defense Against 
Dangerous Individuals 
by EDWARD P. RICHARDS* 
Introduction 
As America moves into the twenty-first century, we must determine 
to what extent individual liberties must be sacrificed for the common 
good. Ideals of liberty and privacy are stretched to the limit as modem 
fears of street crime merge with ancient fears of plague. 1 As the Supreme 
Court confronts new laws molded by these fears, it retraces old patterns 
of jurisprudence and establishes a new public health jurisprudence of 
prevention. 2 
Nation states fear pestilential diseases because they can destroy the 
social order.3 Historically, civilizations have been terrorized by commu­
nicable diseases: 
In earlier ages, pestilences were mysterious visitations, expressions 
of the wrath of higher powers which came out of a dark nowhere 
pitiless, dreadful, and inescapable. In their terror and ignorance, 
* B.A. Rice University, J.D. University of Houston Law Center, M.P.H. University of 
Texas School of Public Health; Research Director, National Center for Preventive Law, Uni­
versity of Denver, College of Law. Research for this Article was supported by Colorado Phy­
sicians Insurance Co. (COPIC). The author acknowledges the assistance of Robin Gray and 
Daniel Deters of the class of 1990 at the University of Denver College of Law. 
1. For a more specific discussion of a traditional appproach to HIV I AIDS, see Richards, 
Communicable Disease Control in Colorado: A Rational Approach to AIDS, 65 DEN. U.L. 
REV. 127, 127-129 1988 [hereinafter Richards]; Richards & Broses, Legal Aspects of Sexually 
Transmitted Disease Control: Private Rights and Public Duties, in SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED 
DISEASE (2d ed., forthcoming). 
2. This Article does not review mental health jurisprudence, except as related to the 
determination of dangerousness. The state has traditionally had the right to confine the men­
tally ill, conditioned on a proper determination of mental illness. See O'Conner v. Donaldson, 
422 U.S. 563 (1975); Parham v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 584 (1979). Mental health cases are not a 
satisfactory basis for restricting future conduct of physically ill persons because they have a 
much larger component of parens patriae power than do the public health cases. Neither does 
this Article pose a general theory of imprisonment. For an excellent review of the jurispru­
dence of imprisonment, see Zimring & Hawkins, Dangerousness and Criminal Justice, 85 
MICH. L. REV. 481, 482-94 (1986). 
3. W. H. MCNEILL, PLAGUES AND PEOPLES 160-65 (1976). 
[329) 
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we did the very things which increased death rates and aggravated 
calamity. . . . Panic bred social and moral disorganization; 
farms were abandoned, and there was shortage of food, famine led 
, ' to civil war, and, in some instances, to fanatical religious move­
ments which contributed to profound spiritual and political 
transformations. 4 
Epidemics have ravaged the United States at several points in its 
history. In response, legislatures granted public health authorities sub­
stantial power, 5 and the courts supported this delegation of power based 
on society's right of self-defense. 6 In hindsight, some of these disease 
control measures were ineffective, some even detrimental. Yet, these 
measures did serve the broader purpose of preserving order by assuaging 
fear through action and authority.7 
A series of recent United States Supreme Court decisions has pro­
duced a nee-public health jurisprudence. The new public health cases all 
involve quasi-criminal proceedings in which defendants stood accused of 
threatening the public welfare through violent action. In stepwise fash­
ion, the Court has approved ever greater restrictions on the liberty of 
individuals who have not been convicted of a crime. Although these de­
cisions may seem unrelated to disease control, they apply traditional pub­
lic· health rationales and procedures to individuals who pose a threat to 
society. 
This jurisprudence of prevention builds on the foundation of tradi­
ti0nal public health jurisprudence-society's right to restrict individuals 
for the common good. The link between the old disease control cases 
and the Supreme Court's recent decisions is that both attempt to preserve 
sdeial order through prevention rather than punishment. Although 
pragmatically a detainee may care little whether he is locked up for pun­
ishment or to prevent future harm, jurisprudentially the difference is 
profound. The courts have required few procedural safeguards -in public 
health cases because persons are deprived of liberty to protect the public 
4. H. ZINSSER, RATS, LICE AND HISTORY 129 (1963). 
5. As discussed later in this Article, courts have sanctioned involuntary vaccinations, 
detention, and treatment of suspected venereal disease carriers, the isolation of tuberculosis 
carriers, and the general authority to do whatever is necessary to control the spread of commu­
nicable diseases. 
6. It has therefore been adjudged that the States may legislate to prevent the spread 
of crime, and may exclude from their limits paupers, convicts, persons likely to be­
come a public charge, and persons affiicted with contagious or infectious diseases. 
These and other like things having immediate connection with the health, morals, 
and safety of the people, may be done by the States in the exercise of the right of self­
defence. 
Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461, 478 (1894). 
7. J. H. POWELL, BRING OUT YOUR DEAD (1949) [hereinafter POWELL]. 
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welfare, not as a punishment. 8 
In the prevention cases, the Supreme Court has allowed the disasso­
ciation of punishment and prevention in criminal law: states may now 
restrict the liberty of individuals to protect the public welfare, irrespec­
tive of the nature of the threat. In adopting the kernel of traditional 
public health jurisprudence, the right of societal self-defense, the preven­
tion cases also approve the three hallmarks of public health jurispru­
dence: 1) deference to non-judicial expert decision makers; 2) post­
restriction judicial review through habeas corpus, rather than full pre­
restriction judicial review; and 3) proof of future dangerousness based on 
scientific rather than criminal law standards of proof. 
The prevention decisions signal an increasing willingness of the 
Supreme Court to subrogate individual liberty to the common good. 9 
This shift from individualistic to communal values will profoundly affect 
many areas of jurisprudence, and the most direct effect will be the revi­
val of traditional public health jurisprudence. . At present there is 
profound confusion among public health officers. The nation's public 
health system is in disarray; major public health responsibilities-from 
fighting critical epidemics such as AIDS, to keeping drinking water 
safe-"have become so fragmented that deliberate action . . . is often 
difficult, if not impossible . . . .  "10 A driving force behind this fragmenta­
tion of public health efforts is the perception on the part of health officers 
that they no longer have the authority to restrict an individual's liberty to 
protect the public safety. They assume that the strides made by the 
Supreme Court and the Congress in the protection of individual liberty 
have been at the expense of public hc;alth authority. 1 1  Through its new 
public health decisions, however, the Court has reaffirmed the substan­
tive and procedural foundations of the traditional disease control cases. 
Having applied these principles in new contexts, the Court should not 
now abandon them when it reviews traditional disease control cases. 12 
' 
8. While there is certainly a component of prevention in all criminal law cases, it has 
historically been subrogated to the issue of punishment. 
9. But note that the jurisprudence of prevention is not a sound basis for abandoning 
criminal due process protections when the state intends to punish, rather than to prevent fu­
ture harm. Once an act is committed, the rationale for expedited procedures and abbreviated 
due process disappears. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that the commission of 
dangerous acts in the past may indicate that the individual will commit dangerous acts in the 
future. 
10. Cimons, Panel Stresses Public Health Risks; Study Finds System Now Lacks Ability to 
Offer Safeguards, L.A. Times, Sept. 8, 1988, Part 1 at 18, col. 1. 
11. Id. 
12. Recent commentary asserting the unconstitutionality of traditional disease control 
measures, including deprivations of liberty, has been written with a view to homosexual HIV 
carriers. It would be incongruous for the Court to strike a disease control measure limiting 
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This Article first traces the evolution of the theme of punishment 
versus prevention through the traditional public health cases. The sec­
ond section of the Article elucidates these threads in the new prevention 
cases. The discussion of the prevention cases begins with an analysis of 
In re Gault13 and In re Winship. 14 These cases represent the Supreme 
Court's traditional position that all crime-related detentions are punish­
ments requiring full due process protections. It is the explicit rejection of 
the due process absolutism expressed in Gault and Winship that marks 
the beginning of a modem jurisprudence of prevention. 
The discussion of the prevention cases focuses on their adoption of 
traditional public health themes. In these opinions, the Supreme Court 
has limited the presumption of innocence to criminal trials, endorsed the 
preventive detention of adults and juveniles to prevent future criminal 
acts, upheld legislative measures providing for confinement of individuals 
through civil actions without criminal due process protections, and al­
lowed detention of individuals under the authority of expert 
decisionmakers. 
The final section of this Article discusses the ramifications of pre­
ventive jurisprudence. Through the use of civil standards of proof, these 
decisions legitimize prospective efforts to control certain types of crimi­
nal behavior, broaden the state's authority to confine the dangerous men­
tally ill, and permit confinements to be carried out expeditiously. These 
decisions also pose the threat of totalitarianism. The Article concludes 
with an analytic framework for balancing public protection against indi­
vidual liberty. 
I. Public Health Jurisprudence 
A. The Historical Perspective 
Sanitation laws are the oldest public health measures. 15 The Ro­
mans developed the discipline of sanitary engineering, building water 
works and sewers. 16 The next advance in public health was the quaran­
tine of disease-carrying ships and their passengers instituted in response 
homosexual practices when the Court has already found that majoritarian moral beliefs are 
sufficient to support the criminalization of homosexual sexual activity. See Bowers v. Hard­
wick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) 
13. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
14. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
15. See Leviticus 1 1-16. 
' 16. c. BOLDUAN & N. BOLDUAN, PUBLIC HEALTH AND HYGIENE 4 (1941) [hereinafter 
BOLDUAN). 
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to the diseases brought back by the Crusaders. 17 The English statutory 
and common law recognized the right of the state to quarantine and limit 
the movement of plague carriers. Blackstone observed that disobeying 
quarantine orders merited severe punishments, 18 including death. 19 
17. The word "quarantine" derives from quadraginta, meaning forty. It was first used 
between 1377 and 1403 when Venice and the other chief maritime cities of the Mediterranean 
adopted and enforced a forty-day detention for all vessels entering their ports. BOLDUAN, 
supra note 16, at 7. 
18. The fourth species of offenses, more especially affecting the commonwealth, are 
such as are against the public health of the J}ation; a conceern of the highest impor­
tance, and for the preservation of which there are in many countries special magis­
trates or curators appointed. . . . The first of these offenses is a felony, but by the 
blessing of Providence for more than a century past, incapable of being committed in 
this nation. For by statute I Jae. I c. 31  . . .  it is enacted, that if any person infected 
with the plague, or dwelling in any infected house, be commanded by the mayor or 
constable or other head officer of his town or vill to keep his house, and shall venture 
to disobey it he may be enforced . . .  to obey such necessary command and, if any 
hurt ensue by such enforcement, the watchmen are thereby indemnified. And fur­
ther, if such person so commanded to confine himself goes abroad, and converses in 
company, if he has no plague sore upon him, he shall be punished as a vagabond by 
whipping, and be bound to his good behavior; but ifhe has any infectious sore upon 
him uncured, he then shall be guilty of felony. By the statute 26 George. II, c. 6 . . .  
the method of performing quarantine, or forty days probation, by ships coming from 
infected countries, is put in a much more regular and effectual order than formerly, 
and masters of ships, coming from infected places and disobeying the directions there 
given, or having the plague on board and concealing it, are guilty of felony without 
benefit of clergy. The same penalty also attends persons escaping from the lazarets, 
or places wherein quarantine is to be performed, and officers and watchmen neglect­
ing their duty, and persons conveying goods or letters from ships performing 
quarantine. 
4 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARlES *161. 
The most severe of these penalties were reserved for the masters of ships who disobeyed 
quarantine orders or concealed the presence of plague on their ships. The authority to quaran­
tine ships is preserved in the earliest United States laws and court decisions. E.g., Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1,  1 14, (1824): 
New Hampshire passed her quarantine laws first, February 3d, 1789 . . .  Connecticut 
passed hers in May, 1795. The laws of Maryland show the temporary continuation of 
those laws in that State, from 1784 to 1785, from 1785 to 1792, from 1792 to 1799, 
and so down to 1 8 10 . . .  The State of Virginia passed, 26th of December, 1792, 'an 
act reducing into one the several acts to oblige vessels coming from foreign parts,. to 
perform quarantine;' . . .  Georgia passed her quarantine law December 17th, 1793. 
Undoubtedly those laws derive their efficacy from the sovereign authority of the 
States; and they expressly restrain, and indeed prohibit, the entry of vessels into part 
of the waters and ports of the States. They are all so similar, that one or two may 
suffice as examples. The quarantine law of· Georgia, s. J. prohibits the landing of 
persons or goods coming in any vessel fro� an infected place, without permission 
from the proper authority; and enacts, that the said vessels or boats, and the persons 
and goods coming and imported in, or going on board during the time of quarantine; 
and all ships, vessels, boats, and persons, receiving any persons or goods under quar­
antine, shall be subj�ct to such orders, rules and directions, touching quarantine, as 
shall be made by the authority directing the same. . . . · 
19. In retrospect, it is difficult to determine whether death was meant as a· punishment or 
was imposed to prevent future dangerous conduct. 
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The American colonies adopted the English laws on the control of 
diseases. When the Constitution was written, public health power was 
left to the states, 20 because it was considered fundamental to the state's 
police power.21 Soon after the Constitution was ratified, the states were 
forced to exercise their police power to combat an epidemic of yellow 
fever that raged in New York and Philadelphia. The flavor of that period 
was later captured in an argument before the Supreme Court: 
For ten years prior, the yellow-fever had raged almost annually in 
the city, and annual laws were passed to resist it. The wit of man 
was exhausted, but in vain. Never did the pestilence rage more 
violently than in the summer of 1798. The State was in despair. 
The rising hopes of the metropolis began to fade. The opinion was 
gaining ground, that the cause of this annual disease was indige­
nous, and that all precautions against its importation were useless. 
But the leading spirits of that day were unwilling to give up the 
city without a final desperate effort. The havoc in the summer of 
1798 is represented as terrific. The whole country was roused. A 
cordon sanitaire was thrown around the city. Governor Miffiin of 
Pennsylvania proclaimed a non-intercourse between New York 
and Philadelphia. 22 
The extreme nature of the actions, including isolating the federal 
government (which was sitting in Philadelphia at the time), were consid­
ered an appropriate response to the threat of yellow fever.23 The terri­
fying nature of these early epidemics24 predisposed the courts to grant 
20. T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 572 [hereinafter COOLEY]. 
21.  Police is in general a system of precaution, either for the prevention of crimes or 
of calamities. Its business may be distributed into eight distinct branches: l .  Police 
for the prevention of offenses; 2. Police for the prevention of calamities; 3. Police for 
the prevention of endemic diseases; 4. Police of charity; 5. Police of interior commu­
nications; 6. Police of public amusements; 7. Police for recent intelligence; 8. Police 
for registration. 
J. BENTHAM, GENERAL VIEW OF PUBLIC OFFENSES, (quoted in COOLEY, supra note 20 at 
5 72). 
It is a well-recognized principle that it is one of the first duties of a state to take all 
necessary steps for the promotion and protection of the health and comfort of its 
inhabitants. The preservation of the public health is universally conceded to be one 
of the duties devolving upon the state as a sovereignty, and whatever reasonably 
tends to preserve the public health is a subject upon which the legislature, within its 
police power, may take action. 
Jn re Halko, 246 Cal. 2d 553, 556, 54 Cal. Rptr. 661, 663 (1966). 
22. Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 340-41 (1849). 
23. They may be thought to conflict strangely with the doctrine, that the Federal 
government alone has jurisdiction of commerce between the States, but it may serve 
as an illustration that the police laws of the States are paramount; that when men are 
trembling for their lives, no commercial regulations can oppose a moment's obstacle. 
Id. at 341. 
24. Ten percent of the population of Philadelphia died of yellow fever between September 
and November, 1 793. POWELL, supra note 7 at xiv. 
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public health authorities a free hand in their attempts to prevent the 
spread of disease: 
Every state has acknowledged power to pass, and enforce quaran­
tine, health, and inspection laws, to prevent the introduction of 
disease, pestilence, or unwholesome provisions; such laws interfere 
with no powers of Congress or treaty stipulations; they relate to 
internal police, and are subjects of domestic regulation within each 
state, over which no authority can be exercised by any power 
under the Constitution, save by requiring the consent of Congress 
to the imposition of duties on exports and imports, and their pay­
ment into the treasury of the United States.2 
The last great short-term epidemic in the United States was the 
Spanish Influenza in 19 18- 19 19,26 and the influenza epidemic of 1958-
1959 killed 50,000 Americans in one winter.27 Venereal diseases have 
always been a scourge, 28 rendering women sterile, 29 crippling babies, 30 
and, in the case of syphilis, causing long-term illness and death. Tuber­
culosis was the leading cause of death for young adults as late as 1940, 
killing 60,000 people a year, 31 with perhaps twenty times that many in­
fected at any one tim�. 32 
Acknowledging the public's justified fear of infectious disease, 
courts have granted broad powers to public health officers. 33 Only in the 
25. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 616 (1840). 
26. This epidemic killed 200,000 people in the U.S. and 20,000,000 worldwide. A.W.
CROSBY, EPIDEMIC AND PEACE 1918 (1976). 
27. The fear of influenza is still sufficiently strong to have fueled the great swine flu cam­
paign, despite evidence that human beings are not endangered by swine flu. This failure of 
public health policy clearly contributed to the paralysis of public health officials confronted by 
AIDS. For a discussion of influenza in the U.S. and the swine flu non-epidemic, see R. NEU­
STADT & H. FINEBERG, THE EPIDEMIC THAT NEVER WAS (1983). For a discussion of the 
successful investigation of Legionnaires' Disease, see G. THOMAS & M. MORGAN-WITTS, 
ANATOMY OF AN EPIDEMIC (1982). 
28. Cutler & Arnold, Venereal Disease Control by Health Departments in the Past: Lessons 
for the Present, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 372 (1988). 
29. M. PERNOLL & R. BENSON, CURRENT OBSTETRIC AND GYNECOLOGIC DIAGNOSIS
& TREATMENT 718 (6th ed. 1987). 
30. Rathbun, Review, IO SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 93 (1983); Rathbun, Con­
genital Syphilis: A Proposal for Improved Surveillance, Diagnosis, and Treatment, IO SEXU­
ALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES I02 (1983). 
3 1 .  BOLDUAN, supra note 16, at 80. In 1915 there were more than 1 00,000 tuberculosis 
deaths per year, earning tuberculosis the moniker "white plague." Id. 
32. The Center for Disease Control (CDC) predicts that by 1991 about 100,000 persons a
year will die of diseases secondary to HIV infections. Proportionate to the population, this is 
about the same death rate as for tuberculosis in 1940. See generally R. DuBos, THE WHITE
PLAGUE (1952). 
33. Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 186
U.S. 380 (1902); Jacobson v.  Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11  (1905); Board of Health v.  Ct. of 
Common Pleas, 83 N.J.L. 392, 85 A. 217 (1912); Ex Parte Company, I06 Ohio 50, 139 N.E. 
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last thirty years has a substantial segment of the population begun to 
question the value of public health restrictions. This diminishing support 
for public health restrictions is less rooted in an increased sensitivity to 
individual liberties than it is a product of the loss of fear of communica­
ble diseases. With the advent of sanitary measures such as pasteurization 
of milk and the development of antibiotics, society's fear of communica­
ble diseases has declined. 
Few cases have challenged the constitutionality of state actions 
taken to protect citizens from a commµnicabl� disease. 34 The only suc­
cessful attacks on such exercises of state police power have been based on 
federal preemption of state laws that restricted interstate commerce. 35 
Yet, even interference with interstate commerce36 is not always fatal to 
health regulations: 37 If a state regulation is substantially related to 
204 (1922); Ex Parte Caselli, 62 Mont. 201, 204 P. 364 (1e922); In re Halko, 246 Cal. 2d 553, 54 
Cal Rptr. 661 (1966); Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1973). 
34. Deference to disease control laws was phjlosophically inconsistent with Supreme 
Court decisions handed down during the same period, in which substantive due process argu­
ments were used to strike down laws intended to protect workerse' health. See, e.g., Lochner v. 
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
35. See Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern 
R. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 5 1 1, 525 (1935); 
Sligh v. Kirkwooq, 237 U.S. 52, 59-60 (1915); Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908); Rail­
road Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472 (1878). 
36. Counsel's arguments in Smith v. Turner supporting the authority of the state to pre-
vent the entry of disease carriers were as follows: 
It would be a truer illustration to suppose a citizen or an alien,-no matter whom, 
the President of the United States or the humblest individual that ever entered the 
harbour,-any person capable of being the vehicle of infectious disease,-to ap­
proach our city, bringing infection, bearing'death to thousands,-an approach more 
dreadful than that of an invading army. He is repelled,-justly repelled,-by the 
express authority of the law of nations. (Vattel, Book 2, ch. 9, 123.) 
By whom is he repelled? By the Federal government? Under what clause of the 
Constitution? Under which of its powers? Under its commercial power?-A traffic 
in contagion! a tariff upon disease! Under its war power?-A war with the king of 
terrors! No. The State, and the State alone, has the power, and alone is charged with 
the duty, of repelling disease, and of guarding its confines from the entrance of 
whatever might injure its citizens. 
48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 338 (184�). 
37. For the period of nearly a century since the government was organized Congress 
has passed no quarantine law, nor any other law to protect the inhabitants of the 
United States against the invasion of contagious and infectious diseases from 
abroad; and yet during the early part of the present century, for many years the 
cities of the Atlantic coast, from Boston and New York to Charleston, were devas­
tated by the yellow fever. In later times the cholera has made similar invasions; and 
the yellow fever has been unchecked in its fearful course in the Southern cities, New 
Orleans especially, for several generations. During all this time the Congress of the 
United States never attempted to exercise this or any other power to protect the 
people from the ravages of these dreadful diseases. No doubt they believed that the 
power to do this belonged to the States. Or, if it ever occurred to any of its members 
that Congress might do something in that way, they probably believed that what 
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health and safety, then the Supreme Court will uphold it. 38 This is true 
even if the regulation interferes with interstate commerce, such as would 
result from a cordon sanitaire in which all travel is forbidden. 39 
From vaccinations to quarantines, laws enacted to protect society 
have been upheld even when they force individuals to sacrifice their lib­
erty and privacy.40 Because modem American society has mostly lost its 
fear of infectious disease, it is easy to criticize public health restrictions as 
unnecessarily limiting individual liberty. But to understand United 
States public health jurisprudence, one must realize that it is based on a 
deeply rooted fear of pestilential diseases. 
ought to be done could be better and more wisely done by the authorities of the 
States who were familiar with the matter. 
Morgan's Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Bd. of Health,· 1 1 8  U.S. 455, 466 (1886). 
38. It is for this reason that quarantine laws, which protect the public health, compel 
mere commercial regulations to submit to their control. They restrain the liberty of 
the passengers, they operate on the ship which is the instrument of commerce, and its 
officers and crew, the agents of navigation. They seize the infected cargo, and cast it 
overboard. The soldier and the sailor, though in the service of the government, are 
arrested, imprisoned, and punished for their offenses against soc;iety. Paupers and 
convicts are refused admission into the country. All these things are done, not from 
any power which the States assume to regulate commerce or to interfere with the · 
regulations of Congress, but because police laws . . .  must of necessity have full and 
free operation, according to the exigency which requires their interference. 
Thurlow v. Massachusetts (The License Cases), 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 632 (1847). 
dis­
39. That from an early day the power of the States to enact and enforce quarantine 
laws for the safety and the protection of the health of their inhabitants has been 
recognized by Congr�s, is beyond question. That until Congress has exercised its 
power on the subject, such state quarantine laws and state laws for the purpose of 
preventing, eradicating or controlling the spread of contagious or infectious 
eases, are not repugnant to the Constitution. 
Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 
387 (1902); see also Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 25 1 (1908). 
40. Thomas v. Morris, 286 N.Y. 266, 269, 36 N.E.2d 141, 142 (1941) provides a good 
example of typical disease-control measures for typhoid carriers. The case concerned whether 
the identity of typhoid carriers should be kept confidential. Interestingly, the court found the 
notion of hiding the identity of typhoid carriers absurd. 
The Sanitary Code which has the force of law . . .  requires local health officers to 
keep the State Department of Health informed of the names, ages and addresses of 
known or suspected typhoid carriers, to furnish to the State Health Department nec­
essary specimens for laboratory examination in such cases, to inform the carrier and 
members of his household of the situation and to exercise certain controls over the 
activities of the carriers, including a prohibition against any handling by the carrier 
of food which is to be consumed by persons other than members of his own house­
hold . . . . Why should the record of compliance by the County Health Officer with 
these salutary requirements be kept confidential? Hidden in the files of the health 
offices, it serves no public purpose except a bare statistical one. Made available to 
those with a legitimate ground for inquiry, it is effective to check the spread of the 
dread disease. It would be worse than useless to keep secret an order by a public 
officer that a certain typhoid carrier must not handle foods which are to be served to 
the public. 
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B. Hallmarks of Traditional and Modern Public Health Cases 
As courts have reviewed the constitutionality of laws that ostensibly 
protect the public health and safety, they have developed consistent stan­
dards for what is an acceptable exercise of public health authority. The 
courts have allowed substantial restrictions on individual liberty pursu­
ant to public health laws that seek to prevent future harm rather than to 
punish past actions. If a court finds that a law is directed at prevention 
rather that punishment, it will allow the state to: 
1) rely on expert decisionmakers;41 
2) provide for judicial review through habeas corpus proceedings 
rather than through prerestriction hearings;42 or 
3) use a scientific, rather than a criminal law, standard of proof.43 
Prevention cases share some or all of these three characteristics. 
Traditional public health cases and prevention cases, however, are distin­
guished by their facts: prevention decisions44 are concerned with danger­
ous behavior rather than with communicable disease. 
1. Distinguishing Public Health Restrictions from Punishment 
Although a state's power to protect the public health is broad, it is 
restricted to preventing future harm. The state may not punish a person 
under its public health police powers.45 In public health law, administra­
tive deprivations of liberty are tolerated because their purpose is not to 
punish.46 The Supreme Court's acceptance of the idea that confinement 
to prevent criminal activity is not necessarily punishment marked the 
beginning of the modern jurisprudence of prevention. Central to all the 
prevention decisions is the unbundling of punishment and deprivation of 
liberty in ostensibly criminal law cases. 
41. See In re Halko, 246 Cal.2d 553, 557-58, 54 Cal. Rptr. 661, 664 (1966); see also infra 
notes 57-70 and accompanying text. This broad authority frees public health officials from the 
detailed "least restrictive alternative" analysis required in other situations where the public 
good is less certain. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 41e1 U.S. 1, 5 1  
(1973). 
42. See infra notes 71 -74 and accompanying text. 
43. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. Nothing prevents a state from provid­
ing the same due process protections in its public health laws as it does for criminal cases. To 
do so, however, makes the public health laws unworkable. Criminal due process would force 
the health officer to wait until it could be proven that a person was intentionally spreading a 
communicable disease, but by that time, more people would be infected by the carrier's ' 
actions. 
44. Jurisprudentially, prevention cases are "lost cases." Since they involve criminal con­
duct, they have been pigeonholed as criminal law cases. Conversely, public health cases are 
seen as civil rights cases and are considered in isolation from criminal law cases. 
45. See infra notes 49-52. 
46. See infra notes 49-52. 
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The distinction between allowable restrictions and forbidden pun­
ishment is sometimes finely drawn. For example, being put in the com­
munity pesthouse was seldom a pleasant prospect,47 and with the closing 
of pesthouses, public health restrictions have frequently been carried out 
in prisons.48 The courts have steadfastly allowed persons to be held in a 
penal institution if the purpose is regulatory rather than penal.49 In the 
classic case, a prostitute may be confined in jail as quarantine measure50 
without the due process protections that would be necessary to put her in 
the same jail cel151 as a punishment for prostitution.52 
In the old public health cases, courts recognized that involuntary 
detention in a jail is little different from being incarcerated in the same 
jail. 53 In its recent decisions, the Supreme Court has been less scrupu­
lous in recognizing the trauma of detention. The Court has explicitly 
rejected the argument that a deprivation of liberty should be determined 
by the physical characteristics of the place where one is detained. 54 The 
poetic notion that being in prison does not make one a prisoner55 is sadly 
47. Paul Revere's child was infected during the smallpox epidemic of 1764. Out of con­
cern for her well-being, he refused to allow her to be taken to the pesthouse. As was the 
custom, he and his family were confined in their house for the duration of the infection. Dur­
ing this period (over a month), a quarantine flag was hung in front of the house and a guard 
was posted to keep the Reveres in and others away from the house. FORBES, PAUL REVERE 
AND THE WORLD HE LIVED IN 76-77 (1942). See also Kirk v. Wyman, 83 s.c. 372, 65 S.E. 
387, 388 (1909) (pesthouse described as "coarse and comfortless . . .  adjoin[ing] the city dump­
ing grounds")e. 
48. See Ex parte McGee, 105 Kan. 574, 581, 185 P. 14, 16 (1919), discussing the confine­
ment of men infected with venereal disease in a prison. The court rejected the petitioner's 
claim that he was being punished without due process, concluding that, "While it is true that 
physical facilities constituting part of the penitentiary equipment are utilized, interned persons 
are in no sense confined in the penitentiary, and are not subject to the peculiar obloquy which 
attends such confinement." 
49. See Ex parte Fowler, 85 Okla. Crim. App. 64, 184 P.2d 814, 820 (1947). 
50. For a review of authority, see Ex Parte Company, 106 Ohio 50, 139 N.E. 204 (1922). 
51 .  See In re Dayton, 52 Cal. App. 635, 199 P. 548 (1921); In re Arata, 52 Cal. App. 380, 
383, 198 P. 814, 816 (1921). 
52. See, e.g. , Ex parte Caselli, 62 Mont. 201, 203 P. 364, 365 (1922) (discussing the rights 
of a quarantined person to due process protections): 
In my opinion, the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
and sections 6 and 7 of article 3 of the Constitution of the state of Montana, relied on 
by complainant's counsel, have no application to this class of cases. I cannot con­
clude that the makers of the two Constitutions ever contemplated a situation where a 
state would be rendered powerless to protect itself by prompt and speedy action from 
the spread of a contagion which by neglect might reach to and affect any considerae­
ble number of people in a community. 
53. Ex parte Martin, 83 Cal. App. 2d 164, 170, 188 P.2d 287, 291 (1948). 
54. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
55. "Stone walls do not a prison make, 
Nor iron bars a cage; 
Mindes innocent and quiet take 
340 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vole. 16:329 
at odds with the reality of prison life. 56 The personal consequences of 
detention cannot be ignored. They must not, however, overshadow soci-
· 
ety's interest in self-defense. 
2. Expert Decisionmakers 
Public health jurisprudence is based on a deference to scientific deci­
sion making. This deference may be expressed by incorporating scien­
tific standards into legislation, or by delegating the right to make public 
health decisions to boards of health57 or individual health offi.cers58 who 
are skilled in the science of public health. This deference is illustrated in 
the best-known of the traditional public health cases, Jacobson v. Massa­
chusetts, 59 in which the scientific basis of a Massachusetts law requiring 
vaccination for smallpox was challenged. 
Mr. Jacobson believed that the scientific basis for vaccination was 
unsound and that he would suffer if he was vaccinated. The Massachu­
setts Supreme Court found the statute consistent with the Massachusetts 
state constitution,60 and Jacobson appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court examined the issue of whether in­
voluntary vaccination violated Jacobson's "inherent right of every free­
man to care for his own body and health in such way as seems to him 
best . . .  "61 The Court bifurcated this question, first considering the right 
That for an Hermitage; 
If I have freedome in my Love, 
And in my soule am free 
Angels alone that sore above, 
Injoy such Liberty." 
RICHARD LOVELACE, LUCASTA. "To Althea From Prison," st. 4. 
56. "The vilest deeds like poison weeds, 
Bloom well in -prison air; 
It is only what is good in Man 
That wastes and withers there: 
Pale Anguish keeps the heavy gate, 
And the Warder is Despair. 
OSCAR WILDE, THE BALLAD OF READING GAOL, part V, st. 5. 
57. Board of Health v. Union Common Pleas, 83 N.J.L. 392, 395, 85 A. 217, 2 18  (1912) 
discussed whether the legislature had intended there to be a right of appeal to decisions by the 
Board of Health : 
To assume that the legislature intended to confer a review of a discretionary power of 
this character, vested in a statutory board, charged with its exercise in critical situae­
tions, involving detriment to the life and health of a community, is tantamount to a 
declaration that the police power of the state is moribund and useless. 
58. In re Irby, 1 13 Kan. 565, 215 P. 449 (1923). 
59. 197 U.S. 1 1  (1905). 
60. Commonwealth v. Pear, 183 Mass. 242, 66 N.E. 719 (1903). 
6 1 .  197 U.S. at 26. 
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of the state to invade Jacobson's person by forcing him to submit to 
vaccination: 
This court has more than once recognized it as a fundamental prin­
ciple that "persons and property are subjected to all kinds of re­
straints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, 
health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right of the legis­
lature to do which no question ever was, or upon acknowledged 
general principles ever can be made, so far as natural persons are 
• ' , concerned. "62 
With this language, the Court stated the basic bargain of civiliza­
tion: an individual must give up some personal freedom in exchange for 
the benefits of being in a civilized society. Jacobson sought to enjoy the 
benefit of his neighbors being vaccinated for smallpox63 without person­
ally accepting the risks inherent in vaccination. 64 The Court rejected 
Jacobson's claim which it viewed as an attempt to be a free-rider on 
society.65 
The Court next considered Jacobson's right to contest the scientific 
basis of the Massachusetts vaccination requirement. Accepting that 
some reasonable people still questioned the efficacy of vaccination, 66 the 
Court nonetheless found that it was within the legislature's prerogative 
to adopt one from many conflicting views on a scientific issue. 67 
62. Id. (quoting Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471 (1877)). 
63. The control of smallpox depends on the isolation of individual cases and the mainte­
nance of a certain level of immunity in the population at risk. If everyone other than Jacobson 
was immunized, Jacobson would have a much lower probability of infection than if all of his 
neighbors had declined to be vaccinated. This shared benefit is called herd immunity. See J. 
LAST, PUBLIC HEALTH AND PREVENTIVE MEDICINE, 132 (1986). For a fascinating discus­
sion of the medical knowledge of smallpox contemporaneous with Jacobson, see W. OSLER, 
THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 128 (1905). 
64. Vaccination for smallpox has always carried some risk of serious and sometimes fatal 
complications. See P. BEESON AND w. McDERMOTT, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 2 1 1  (1975). 
65. We are not prepared to hold that a minority, residing or remaining in any city or 
town where smallpox is prevalent, and enjoying the general protection afforded by an 
organized local government, may thus defy the will of its constituted authorities, 
acting in good faith for all, under the legislative sanction of the State. 
197 U.S. at 37. An individual's attempt to enjoy the benefits of society while escaping the 
concomitant restrictions on personal liberty is a recurring theme in public health cases. 
Whether the risks and benefits are linked, as in Jacobson, or indirectly related, such as cases 
quarantining disease carriers, the courts have upheld intrusive measures that benefit society. 
While the prevention cases also adopt this principle of subrogation of individual liberty to 
societal good, they are less concerned with the corresponding benefits to the restricted 
individual. 
66. "It must be conceded that some laymen, both learned and unlearned, and some physi­
cians of great skill and repute, do not believe that vaccination is a preventive of smallpox." Id. 
at 34 (citing Matter of Viemeister, 179 N.Y. 235, 239 (1903)). 
67. "It is no part of the function ofa court or ajury to determine which of two modes was 
likely to be most effective for the protection of the public against disease. That was for the 
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In later cases the courts have shown deference when reviewing dis­
cretionary orders by public health officers:68 only the most general statu­
tory language is needed to support discretionary orders, 69 in contrast to 
the specificity that is necessary for a penal deprivation of liberty. The 
prevention cases share this acceptance of discretionary decision making, 
and in some ways they extend the scope of discretion by permitting 
judges to make decisions that in a traditional public health case would 
normally be made by an expert. 70 
3. Review of Public Health Orders 
Traditional public health laws do not provide for pre-restriction 
hearings to review a health officer's orders.71 Instead, review is through 
post-restriction habeas corpus proceedings.72 Although courts have rec­
ognized that detention involves grave intrusion into an individual's ex-
legislative department to determine in the light of all the information it had or could obtain." 
Jacobson at 30. 
68. "It is not for the courts to determine which scientific view is correct in ruling upon 
whether the police power has been properly exercised. The judicial function is exhausted with 
the discovery that the relation between means and ends is not wholly vain and fanciful, an 
illusory pretense . . . .  " City of New York v. New Saint Mark's Baths, 497 N.Y.S.2d 979, 983 
(1986) (quoting Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 42 (1933)). 
69. In Ex parte Kilbane, 32 Ohio St. 530, 530-531, 67 N.E.2d 22, 22-23 (1945) the court 
upheld public health regulations with the following provisions: 
These regulations authorize the health commissioner of a city to make or cause to be 
made an examination of a person if reasonably suspected of having a venereal disease, 
and it found to be so infected, and whenever in his opinion the public health requires 
it, to order such person placed in quarantine. 
(emphasis in original). 
70. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 279-80 (1984). See infra notes 282-84 and accompany­
ing text. 
71.  See Ex parte Roman, 199 P. 580, (1921). This case was a test of the legality of the 
statute allowing the detention of prisoners suspected of being infected with a communicable 
disease. After upholding the state's power to authorize the holding of a potentially infected 'eprisoner beyond his sentence, the court discussed the review of such detentions: 
However, if, after such arrest or detention, such person challenges the right of the 
authorities to continue the detention, the fundamental law affords such person the 
right to have the legality of his or her detention inquired into by a court of competent 
jurisdiction in a habeas corpus proceeding. The law denies to no one restrained of his 
liberty without a hearing the right to prove in some tribunal that the facts justifying 
his restraint do not exist. 
72. See In re Halko, 246 Cal.2d 553, 554, 54 Cal. Rptr. 661, 662 (1966): 
Petitioner contends the right of the health officer to issue consecutive certificates 
of quarantine and isolation for periods of six months each, "without means of ques­
tioning and judicially determining" the conclusion of the health officer, results in 
"continually depriving one of his liberty." Therefore, section 3285 "is unconstitu­
tional in that it deprives this petitioner of his liberty without due process of law." 
We disagree with the petitioner's interpretation of the law and his assertion that 
section 3285 is unconstitutional. 
343 Spring 1989] THE JURISPRUDENCE OF PREVENTION 
pectation of liberty, 73 the control of communicable disease has been 
found to outweigh the individual privacy interest. 74 
The authority to detain without judicial process was reviewed most 
recently in Reynolds v. McNichols. 75 Ms. Reynolds, a prostitute, chal­
lenged a Denver public health officer's authority to require her to be ex­
amined and treated for venereal disease without a judicial hearing. 76 The 
court rejected petitioner's equal protection claim, 77 declining to apply 
strict scrutiny to the ordinance in question. 78 The court found that both 
the detention and the walk-in orders79 were constitutional.80 
73. The individual may also be subjected to an examination for venereal disease during his 
or her detention. See People v. Strautz, 386 Ill. 360, 54 N.E.2d 441 (1944). 
74. Id. ; Welch v. Shepherd, 165 Kan. 394, 196 P.2d 235 (1948). 
75. 488 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1973). 
76. The statute defined a person under suspicion as any person arrested and charged with 
"vagrancy, prostitution, rape, a violation of this article, or another offense related to sex." Id. 
at 1384. The ordinance provides that persons who have been arrested may be detained in jail 
without bail, pending examination and treatment. 
[T]he detention of any person in jail under the provisions hereof shall continue 
only for such time as is reasonably necessary to examine such person and render 
treatment if such person is found to have a venereal disease in a communicable form. 
The provisions hereof shall not be utilized as, nor construed to be, a penalty or pun­
ishment. No person detained for health under the provisions hereof shall be released 
from such detention even if he or she is otherwise eligible for release on bond or by 
reason of payment of fine, or termination of sentence imposed. 
Id. While vagrancy was not at issue in this case, it would be expected that vagrancy would 
only be an acceptable ground for testing and treatment if it was correlated with communicable 
disease transmission. . 
77. Similarly, the claim that the ordinance was enforced only against females, and 
not males, is, under the circumstances of this case, insufficient to invoke the equal 
protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court indicated that it 
was of the view that the equal protection argument was not properly within the issues 
raised by the pleadings in the case and accordingly did not consider it. In any event, 
in our view plaintiff's suggestion that she was unconstitutionally dealt with by the 
city authorities is under the circumstances unavailing. 
In regard to her equal protection argument, the fact that on the two occasions 
when plaintiff was arrested in a hotel room the plaintiff's customer was not himself 
arrested and detained for examination is not significant. From the record before us, 
there is nothing to indicate that plaintiff did in fact have sex relations with either of 
her male companions, though evidence of solicitation was obvious. Such being the 
case, there was no reason to examine plaintiff's male companions. 
Id. at 1383. 
78. The court asserted only that there was no equal protection claim available and, thus, 
refused to discuss the level of scrutiny which would be applicable to the case. Id. 
79. Detention could have been avoided if the prisoner had agreed to accept treatment 
without further testing. Moreoever, the ordinance empowered the Director of Denver Health 
and Hospitals to order persons suspected of carrying a venereal disease, who were not in jail, to 
present themselves for examination and treatment. See id. at 1385. The ordinance also au­
thorized the Denver police to order persons to present themselves at Denver Health and Hos­
pitals for examination and treatment. Id. at 1386. 
80. Involuntary detention for a limited period of time for the purpose of permitting exame­
ination and treatment of a person reasonably suspected of having a venereal disease has been 
upheld by numerous state courts, against a wide variety of constitutional challenge,s as a valid 
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Perhaps the clearest difference between public health detentions and 
criminal arrests is that public health detentions are not bailable. 81 The 
rationale underlying this rule is that if the person could be relied on not 
to spread the disease while out on bail, there would be no need for deten­
tion in the first place. 82 
4. Standard of Proof 
The deference of courts to public health authority finds further ex­
pression in their rulings on the appropriate standard of proof for restrict­
ing an individual's liberty. 83 When perso�s detained under the public 
health authority petition for habeas corpus relief, the courts use a "rea­
sonable belief" standard for determining the validity of the detention or 
testing orders. 84 
Reasonable belief may be based on individual specific information, 
such as a diagnosis of tuberculosis, 85 which may be obtained through 
voluntary testing of individuals at risk. 86 In modem public health prac-
exercise of the police power designed to protect the public health. Id. at 1382. The Reynolds 
court held: "The provisions of the ordinance permitting limited detention for involuntary ex­
amination and treatment of a venereal disease being in themselves constitutional, the fact that 
the city provides a less onerous alternative, which the plaintiff in this case elected to follow, 
does not violate any constitutional right of the plaintiff." Id. at 1383. 
81. "To grant release on bail to persons isolated and detained on a quarantine order be­
cause they have a contagious disease which makes them dangerous to others, or to the public 
in general, would render quarantine laws and regulations nugatory and of no avail." Varholy 
v. Sweat, 153 Fla. 571, 575, 15  So. 2d 267, 270 (1943). 
82. In this matter, public health cases resemble another police power action where bail is 
not mandatory, the regulation of immigration. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952). 
Congress adopted this same rationale in the Bail Reform Act of 1984. In upholding this law, 
the Supreme Court adopted a public health rationale for not requiring that the state prove its 
case "beyond a reasonable doubt." U.S. v. Salemo, 631 F.Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
83. In re Martin, 83 Cal. App. 2d 164, 167, 188 P.2d 287, 289 (1948), deals with the 
appropriate standard of proof for instituting quarantine. Petitioners were arrested for va­
grancy, then detained on a venereal disease health-hold when they posted bail. 
It would seem unnecessary to state that the delegation of such complete authority 
over one of the most fundamental of our constitutional rights -the right of personal 
liberty-must of necessity carry with it the obligation to exercise such unusual pow­
ers only when, under the facts as brought within the knowledge of the health authori­
ties, "reasonable ground exists to support the beliefe" that the person so held is 
infected. (citation omitted). 
84. Id. at 168-69: "The necessity of proof in cases such as this is analogous to that re­
quired on a preliminary examination before a magistrate prior to commitment on a criminal 
charge, the extent of the inquiry being merely as to the existence of reasonable cause pending 
opportunity for further investigation or examination." 
85. See In re Halko, 246 Cal.2d 553, 54 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1966); Moore v. Draper, 57 So. 2d 
648 (Fla. 1952); Moore v. Armstrong, 149 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1963). 
86. Ex parte Johnston, 40 Cal. App. 242, 180 P. 644 (1919) (petitioner voluntarily submit­
ted to test for venereal disease, and tested positive; health officer then ordered that petitioner 
be detained). 
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tice, statutorily required disease reports are the basis of most disease con­
trol activities. 87 These statutes require physicians and laboratories to 
report on persons found to be infected with the disease in question. 88 
The disease report then becomes the basis for the reasonable belief that 
an individual is infected and should be restricted to protect the public 
health. 
The courts will also accept a reasonable belief based on epidemio­
logic information. 89 Courts have been willing to accept the epidemio:­
logic link between an individual's status, such as being a prostitute,90 and 
the probability that the individual will be infected with a communicable 
disease.91 The Supreme Court used a similar reasonable-belief analysis 
in a prevention case92 involving the release of a successful habeas corpus 
petitioner: the Court found that the fact that the petitioner had been 
convicted of a crime (even though the conviction was overturned) weak­
ened petitioner's claim that he had been unjustly detained.93 The Court's 
reliance on a conviction as evidence of an increased probability of guilt is 
an epidemiologic-based finding analogous to a finding that being a prosti-
87. See Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 228, 177 N.W. 83 1 ,  832 (1920): 
No patient can expect that if his malady is found to be of a dangerously contagious 
nature he can still require it to be kept secret from those to whom, if there was no 
disclosure, such disease would be transmitted. The information given to a physician 
by his patient, though confidential, must, it seems to us, be given and received subject 
to the qualification that if the patient's disease is found to be of a dangerous and so 
highly contagious or infectious a nature that it will necessarily be transmitted to 
others unless the danger of contagion is disclosed to them, then the physician should, 
in that event, if no other means of protection is possible, be privileged to make so 
much of a disclosure to such persons as is necessary to prevent the spread of the 
disease. 
88. See Jones v. Stanko, 1 1 8  Ohio St. 147, 160 N.E. 456 (1928); see also Whalen v. Roe, 
429 U.S. 589 (1977), (discussion of the general power to require the reporting of public health 
and safety related information). 
89. See In re Arata, 52 Cal. App. 380, 198 P. 814 (1921); In re Clemente, 61 Cal. App. 
666, 215 P. 698 (1923); Ex parte Company, 106 Ohioe.SO, 139 N.E. 204 (1922); In re Dayton, 
52 Cal. App. 635, 199 P. 548 (1921); Ex parte Kilbane, 32 Ohio St. 530, 530, 67 N.E.2d 22 
(1945); Ex parte King, 128 Cal. App. 27, 16 P.2d 694 (1932). 
90. "The demographic factors that correlate best with gonorrhea incidence are age, race, 
marital status, socioeconomic status and urban residence. Individuals who are single, have a 
lower socioeconomic status and reside in a large city are more likely to be infected by gonor­
rhea." H. W. HETHCOTE AND J.A. YORKE, LECTURE NOTES IN MATHEMATICS: GONOR­
RHEA TRANSMISSION DYNAMICS AND CONTROL (1984) [hereinafter HETHCOTE]. 
91. But see Caves v. Hilbert, 92 Okla. Crim. 175, 222 P.2d 169 (Crim. App. 1950) (no 
cause to arrest a woman and have her tested for venereal disease just because she was in a hotel 
room with a man, who was not her husband); Ex parte Dillon, 186 P. 170, 49 Cal. App. 239 
(1919) (having sex in rooming houses held not to constitute probable cause for.evenereal dis­
ease quarantine). 
92. Hilton v. Braunskill, 107 S.Ct. 2113  (1987). See infra, Part II, Section B, subsection 6. 
93. See infra text accompanying notes 336-37. 
346 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 16:329 
tute increases a person's probability of being infected with a venereal 
disease. 
II. The Jurisprudence of Prevention 
A. The Background of the Prevention Decisions 
The primal fear of communicable diseases no longer exists in late 
twentieth century America. While there have been isolated incidences of 
hysteria over AIDS, this does not compare with the fear and Draconian 
actions that accompanied epidemics of polio and other easily communi­
cated diseases. Contemporary fears focus on crack dealers,94 juvenile 
gangs,95 rapists,96 serial murderers, and other post-industral urban night­
mares. 97 These fears imprison the elderly in their homes, 98 fuel the "war 
on drugs," and exert pressure on legislatures to pass ever more stringent 
criminal laws.99 Yet, stricter criminal laws have little effect on crime 
94. Enoch Thomas was nine when he started running errands for crack dealers. His 
budding career ended at age 1 1 ,  with a bullet fired point-blank through his head. 
Known as "Shrimpy," he was a small kid with a sweet smile. The deal he died 
for was tiny by the multi-billion dollar standards of the drug business but big enough 
for his employers to kill him and dump his body, encased in a see-through plastic 
bag, two blocks from his home. 
Debusmann, In America's Underbelly, a Deadly Mix of Poverty and Drugs, The Reuter Library 
Report, Sept. 18, 1988. 
95. On Jan. 30, Karen Toshima was one of thousands of people who went to West­
wood Village to have an enjoyable evening. Instead, she found death from a bullet 
fired by a member of a street gang. In her death, she joined the 60 percent of victims 
of gang murders who, like her, were innocent bystanders. Every person who was in 
Westwood Village on Jan. 30 can truthfully say, "But for the grace of God, it could 
have been me," because Karen was not killed by a personal enemy. She was killed by 
our common enemy, a wantonly violent member of a street gang. 
Gang Shooting in Westwood, L.A. Times, Feb. 18, 1988, Part 2, at 6, col. 3 (home ed.). 
96. A man known as the "Elevator Rapist" was sentenced to 175 years in prison by a 
judge who wanted him "kept from the community for the rest of his natural life." 
The man, Ronnie Matthews, 29 years old, was sentenced Monday in State 
Supreme Court in Manhattan to consecutive terms on 15  counts of robbery, rape, 
sodomy and sexual abuse. 
Man given 1 75 Years for Rapes in Harlem, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31,  1988, at B3, col. 1 (city ed.). 
97. "A Saturday afternoon three days before Christmas. A dingy, noisy subway train rolls 
under Greenwich Village and approaches the World Trade Center. Five shots ring out in eight 
seconds. Four black youths lie wounded. Bernhard Goetz becomes a legend." Up in Arms over 
Crime; As the Goetz case showed, Americans are fearful and angry, TIME, April 8, 1985, at 28. 
98. French police on Friday charged two men with the murders of a number of old 
women who were strangled in their Paris homes over the past three years. 
Police named the accused as Thierry Paulin, 24, from the French Caribbean 
island of Martinique, and his friend Jean-Thierry Mathurin, from French Guyana. 
They were both arrested on Wednesday. 
Two Men Charged with Murders of Elderly Paris Women, The Reuter Library Report, Dec. 4, 
1987. 
99. But then what can you expect from people who often seem to concern themselves 
with the rights of criminals and forget about the rights of the people the criminals 
prey on. (Applause.) We believe justice demands that a crack dealer with a machine 
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rates. 100 The failure of traditional criminal laws has led legislatures to 
pass laws to restrain persons suspected of posing a threat to society. The 
prevention cases arise from constitutional challenges to these laws. 
The prevention cases have announced a stark rejection of the tradi­
tional rule that individuals may not be detained without full criminal due 
process protections. This rule, established in the cases of In re Gault101 
and In re Winship102, was based on the premise that confinement consti­
tutes punishment irrespective of the intent of the law authorizing the 
confinement, and that full due process protections are therefore required 
for all detentions. 103 The rejection of Gault and Winship is the corner­
stone of prevention jurisprudence. 
1. In re Gault104 
In re Gault arose when fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault was arrested 
for making an obscene phone call. After a series of summary proceed­
ings, the Juvenile Court judge committed Gerald to the State Industrial 
School until he was 21 or otherwise discharged by process of law.105 The 
Arizona Supreme Court rejected Gerald's writ of review, upholding the 
juvenile court's ruling. 106 The United States Supreme Court accepted the 
case for the purpose of reviewing the adequacy of the due process af­
forded by the Arizona delinquency proceedings. 107 
The Gault Court first reviewed the history of the juvenile court 
movement. 108 The Court recognized the salutary motives behind the 
movement to create a separate juvenile justice system, 109 but found that 
gun who murders a police officer in the line of duty should give up his life as his 
punishment. (Applause.) We must protect our protectors, and that means the death 
penalty for these vicious killers. (Applause.) If you ask me, there are no Americans 
braver and no citizens more precious than the men and women who guard us-our 
state and local police. (Applause.) 
Federal News Service, Sept. 22, 1988 (remarks of President Reagan to Texas GOP fundraising 
dinner, George Brown Convention Center, Houston, Texas). 
100. C.E. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 189 (1978). 
101.  387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
• 102. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
103. Id. at 365. 
104. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
105. Id. at 7-8. 
106. See Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. 18 1, 407 P.2d 760 (1965). 
107. We consider only the problems presented to us by this case. These relate to the 
proceedings by which a determination is made as to whether a juvenile is a "delin­
quent" as a result of alleged misconduct on his part, with the consequence that he 
may be committed to a state institution. 
Gault, 387 U.S. at 13. 
108. Id. at 14-19. 
109. "The early reformers were appalled by adult procedures and penalties, and by the fact 
that children could be given long prison sentences and mixed in jails with hardened criminals. 
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the urge to do good had led to a system of juvenile justice that departed 
from traditional notions of due process: 
Accordingly, the highest motives and most enlightened impulses 
led to a peculiar system for juveniles, unknown to our law in any 
comparable context. The constitutional and theoretical basis for 
this peculiar system is-to say the least-debatable. And in prac­
tice . . e. the results have not been entirely satisfactory. 110 
Weighing the benefits and detriments of juvenile justice systems, 111 
the Court concluded that the benefits of allowing juvenile court judges 
wide discretion did not outweigh the detriments. The Court narrowed its 
inquiry to consideration of the physical confinement involved when a ju­
venile is detained. Through its eloquent description of confinement, 112 
and its reference to existing juvenile court proceedings as a "kangaroo 
court", 113 the Court expressed its view that juvenile detention is not con­
stitutionally different from adult imprisonment. 114 The Gault Court 
stated that juveniles are entitled to the full panoply of criminal due pro­
cess protections:· notice of charges, 115 the right to counsel, 116 the right to 
confront witnesses, 117 and the privilege against self-incrimination. 118 
2. In re Winship119 
Samuel Winship was a twelve-year-old boy who had stolen $ 1 12 
from a woman's pocketbook. 120 The state petitioned the family court to 
have Samuel declared a juvenile delinquent121 and sent to training 
They were profoundly convinced that society's duty to the child could not be confi'1ed by the 
concept of justice alone." Id. at 15. 
1 10. Id. at 17-18. 
1 1 1 . Id. at 17-27. 
1 12. A boy is charged with misconduct. The boy is committed to an institution where 
he may be restrained of liberty for years. It is of no constitutional consequence-and 
of limited practical meaning-that the institution to which he is committed is called 
an Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a 
"receiving home" or an "industrial school" for juveniles is an institution of confine­
ment in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. His world be­
comes "a building with whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional 
· 
hours . . . .  " 
Id. at 27 (footnote omitted). 
1 13. Id. at 28. 
1 14. "In view of this, it would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not require the 
procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in the phrase 'due process.'e" Id. 
1 15. Id. at 31 .  
1 16. Id. at 41. 
1 17. Id. at 56. 
1 18. Id. at 55. 
1 19. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
120. W. v. Family Court, 24 N.Y.2d 196, 247 N.E. 2d 253, 257 (1969). 
121 .  A minor could be found to be a juvenile delinquent if he or she committed an act 
which, if done by an adult, would constitute a crime. 247 N.E.2d at 255. 
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school. The family court adjudged the minor a delinquent, and was af­
firmed in a memorandum decision. 122 The New York Appeals Court 
reviewed the decision in light of the requirements of In re Gault. The 
court held that while a juvenile proceeding need not afford the proce­
dural protections of a criminal trial, the juvenile must be afforded the 
essentials of due process and fair treatment. 123 
The New York Appeals Court sought to uphold the New York law 
by distinguishing Gault on substantive and procedural grounds. The 
procedural argument was twofold: first, delinquency proceedings in the 
Family Court are not criminal proceedings; 124 second, in contrast to 
Gault, which involved a proceeding with no procedural safeguards, 125 
New York did afford minors reasonable procedural protections. 126 The 
substantive argument was based on a parens patriae approach to juvenile 
proceedings: 
The Judge, acting as a mature and well-balanced parent, tries to 
find the answer to the child's trouble; and only if all else fails and 
there is no other recourse, does he commit the child to any institu­
tion, and even then he tries to find the one best suited to the child's 
needs and having the fewest punitive policies. 127 
The New York Appeals Court concluded that the paternalistic New 
York Family Court Act was distinguishable from the punitive and proce­
durally flawed Arizona law -at issue in Gault, 128 and upheld the determi­
nation that Samuel Winship was a delinquent. 129 
The United States Supreme Court took the appeal to review the nar­
row question of whether the due process requirements, announced in 
Gault mandated that the facts in a juvenile delinquency proceeding be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 130 The Court's decision was prede­
termined by the question it sought to answer: Does Gault hold that it is 
122. In the Matter of Samuel W., 291 N.Y.S. 2d 1005 (1968) (mem.). 
123. W. v. Family Court, 247 N.E.2d at 255-56. 
124. Careful and fully explicit safeguards, however, are provided in the statute to 
insure that an adjudication of this kind is not a "conviction" (§ 781 ); that it affects no 
right or privilege, including the right to hold public office or to obtain a license 
(§ 782); and a cloak of protective confidentiality is thrown around all the proceed-' 
' ings. (§ § 783-84). 
W. v. Family Court, 247 N.E.2d at 256. 
125. Gault, 387 U.S. at 5. 
126. W., 247 N.E.2d at 257. 
127. Id. at 254. , 
128. "The decision in Gault, in which there was almost a total absence of due process, is 
not necessarily to be read as an interdiction of this standard of proof required by the New 
York statute." Id. at 257. 
129. Id. at 258. 
130. "This case presents the single, narrow question whether proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is among the 'essentials of due process and fair treatment' required during the adjudica-
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the fact of locking a person up, rather than the label on the detention, 
that is determinative of the necessary standard of proof?e131 
The Winship Court began its opinion with a lengthy discussion of 
the historical basis for the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of 
proof in criminal prosecutions. 132 Besides the weight of history, the 
Court identified two other reasons for requiring the "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions. First, the Court noted the al­
most uniform acceptance of the standard in common law jurisdictions. 133 
Although the Court stopped short of adopting jurisprudence by survey, it 
said that "such adherence does 'reflect a profound judgment about the 
way in which law should be enforced and justice administered.' "134 The 
Court's second basis for accepting the "beyond a reasonable doubt" stan­
dard was a risk calculus previously articulated in Speiser v. Randall:135 
There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in 
factfinding, which both parties must take into account. Where one 
party has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal 
defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by 
the process of placing on the other party the burden of producing a 
sufficiency of proof in the first instance, and of persuading the 
factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reason­
able doubt.136 
The core of the decision in Winship is the Court's acceptance of the 
Gault standard that regulatory confinements are constitutionally indis­
tinguishable from punitive incarcerations. Referring to Gault, the Win­
ship Court said: 
We made clear in that decision that civil labels and good intentions 
do not in themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safe­
guards in juvenile courts, for "[a] proceeding where the issue is 
whether the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to 
the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a 
felony prosecution. 137 
Having established the critical role of the "beyond a reasonable 
tory stage when a juvenile is charged with an act which would constitute a crime if committed 
by an adult." Winship, 397 U.S. at 359. 
131 .  "In effect the Court of Appeals distinguished the proceedings in question here from a 
criminal prosecution by use of what Gault called the 'civil label-of-convenience which has been 
attached to juvenile proceedings.'e" Id. at 365 (citations omitted). 
132. Id. at 361-64. 
133. Id. at 362. 
134. Id. at 361e-62 (citation omitted). 
135. 357 U.S. 513  (1958). 
136. Id. at 525-26. 
137. Winship, 397 U.S. at 365. 
351 Spring 1989] THE JURISPRUDENCE OF PREVENTION 
doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions, 138 the Winship Court's equa­
tion of juvenile proceedings with felony prosecutions mandates the appli­
cation of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in juvenile 
proceedings. 139 
Ultimately, the bases for the majority's decision later provided the 
foundation for other courts to undermine Winship's holding. In particu­
lar, the Winship majority's reliance on jurisprudential majoritarianism 140 
put the holding in a tenuous position. Although it is true that most, if 
not all, jurisdictions require the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in 
criminal prosecutions, it is also true that most jurisdictions do not regard 
civil detentions as equivalent to criminal prosecutions. 
In addition, the Court's assumption that liberty is a transcendent 
value, i.e., one that cannot be set off by the state's interest in a conviction, 
· irreversibly shifts the balance of risk in favor of the defendant. Yet bal­
ancing risks is fundamental to the right of societal self-defense that un­
derlies both traditional public health jurisprudence and the jurisprudence 
of prevention. Because balancing risks is so fundamental, the Court in 
subsequent prevention cases adopted the Winship formulation. Unlike 
the Winship Court, these courts did not find the defendant's liberty tran­
scendent. By increasing the weight allocated to society's interest in 
preventing harm, these courts used a balancing of risks to justify not 
providing full criminal due process protections in the same circum­
stances where the Gault and Winship Courts would have mandated them. 
Thus, the decline of precedent established by the Gault and Winship deci­
sions paved the way for the Court's jurisprudence of prevention. 
138. "Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt 
standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against convic­
tion, except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime for which he is charged." Id. at 364. 
139. "In sum, the constitutional safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is as much 
required during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding as are those constitutional 
safeguards applied in Gault." Winship, 391 U.S. at 368. 
140. See, e.g. , Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986): 
Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been subject to state 
intervention throughout the history of Western Civilization. Condemnation of those 
practices is firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards . . . .  The 
common law of England, including its prohibition of sodomy, became the received 
law of Georgia and the other Colonies. In 1816  the Georgia Legislature passed the 
statute at issue here, and that statute has been continuously in force in one form or 
another since that time. To hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow 
protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching. 
This is essentially not a question of personal "preferences" but rather of the legisla­
tive authority of the State. I find nothing in the Constitution depriving a State of the 
power to enact the statute challenged here. 
Id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
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B. The Prevention Cases 
The October 1978 term of the United States Supreme Court was a 
watershed for prevention jurisprudence. In the companion cases of Add­
ington v. Texas141 and Bell v. Wolfish, 142 the Court rejected the rule of 
Winship and Gault that civil involuntary confinements require the same 
due process as criminal prosecutions. Both Addington and Bell recognize 
that the state may detain persons without punishing them. 
I. Addington v. Texas 
Addington was a sympathetic case in which to reject the 
Gault/Winship protections. The defendant, who was clearly mentally ill, 
might have been 'denied treatment if the state was forced to provide full 
due process protections. By abandoning the absolutist position of Win­
ship and Gault, Addington allowed the Court to recast the distinction 
between regulatory and punitive restrictions. 
Mr. Addington had a' long history of mental illness, having been 
temporarily committed to state mental hospitals seven times in the six 
years prior to the incident that led to this case. 143 The case began when 
Mr. Addington was arrested for a misdemeanor assault against his 
mother. Pursuant to Texas law, 144 his mother petitioned the state to 
commit him to the state hospital for an indefinite period. 145 Mr. Adding­
ton retained counsel and contested the commitment. At his trial, the 
state offered uncontroverted evidence that "appellant suffered from seri­
ous delusions, that he often had threatened to injure both of his parents 
and others, that he had been involved in several assaultive episodes while 
hospitalized and that he had caused substantial property damage both at 
his own apartment and at his parents' home."e146 The trial court in­
structed the jury that it must find that the state established its case by 
141. 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
142. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
143. 441 U.S. at 420. 
144. TEX. REV. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-3 1 to 5547-57 (Vernon 1958 and Supp. 1978-
1979). 
145. State v. Turner, 556 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, Turner v. Texas, 435 U.S. 
929 (1978), provides information about the Texas commitment process under the Texas 
Mental Health Code that the courts relied on in reviewing Addington. The state could not 
move for an indefinite involuntary commitment unless the person failed to respond to treat­
ment during temporary hospitalization. This temporary confinement had to be for at least 60 
days, and had to be close in time to the petition for indefinite confinement. The state then had 
to prove by competent expert testimony that the proposed patient was mentally ill, posed a 
threat to self or others, and was mentally incompetent. These requirements assured that indef­
inite commitments would only be used for persons who had established mental illness. 556 
S.W.2d at 564. 
146. Addington, 441 U.S. at 420-21. 
353 Spring 1989] THE JURISPRUDENCE OF PREVENTION 
"clear, unequivocal and convincing" evidence. 147 The jury found that 
Frank Addington "was mentally ill and required hospitalization for his 
own welfare and protection, as well as the protection of others."148 
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals focused on the parallels between 
indefinite civil confinement and criminal incarceration. Based on this 
analysis, the court of civil appeals reversed the trial court, holding that 
the danger to self and others must be proved "beyond a reasonable 
doubt."149 The state appealed the reversal, maintaining that State v. Tur­
ner150 established that the legal elements necessary to support a menfal 
health commitment need be proven only by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
The Texas Supreme Court found Turner controlling. 151  The central 
issue in Turner (and the one that was ultimately determinative in the 
United States Supreme Court decision in Addington) was whether a civil 
commitment proceeding is punitive and thus controlled by Winship and . 
Gault. 152 In a brief opinion based on the holding in Turner, the Texas 
Supreme Court reversed the civil appeals court and reinstated the trial 
court's finding that Frank Addington should be confined indefinitely in 
the Austin State Hospital. 153 The Texas Supreme Court held that civil 
commitments are not punitive, but are undertaken to benefit the patient 
as well as to protect society. 154 Since the court found civil commitments 
to be civil proceedings, it found that the elements of the state's case need 
only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 155 
147. Id. at 421. 
148. State v. Addington, 557 S.W.2d 5 1 1  (Tex. 1977). 
149. Addington v. State, 546 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Civ. App. Beaumont 1977). 
150. 556 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1977). 
151 .  State v. Addington, 557 S.W.2d 5 1 1  (Tex. 1977). 
152. The respondent points out the similarities between juvenile delinquency proceed­
ings and civil commitment proceedings; the stigma which attaches to an adjudication 
of delinquency compares with the stigma concomitant with the finding that one is 
mentally ill; indefinite confinement of a juvenile delinquent for rehabilitation com­
pares with indefinite commitment for treatment. These similarities have prompted 
several courts to conclude that due process requires proof beyond· a reasonable doubt 
in civil commitment cases. 
Turner, 556 S.W.2d at 564-65. 
153. 557 S.W.2d at 512. 
154. Id. at 511 .  
155. The judge in the Addington trial court instructed the jury that they must make their 
findings based on clear and convincing evidence. The Texas Supreme Court in Turner found 
that Texas did not recognize clear and convincing as distinct from the usual civil standard of a 
preponderance of the evidence: 
Some courts in other jurisdictions make a distinction between the standard of clear 
and convincing evidence and the usual civil standard of the preponderance of the 
evidence; however, Texas Courts review evidence by but two standards: factual suffi­
ciency and legal sufficiency. The requirement of clear and convincing evidence is 
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The Texas Supreme Court decision was appealed directly to the 
United States Supreme Court on the issue of the proper standard of proof 
for involuntary commitment in a mental institution. 156 Frank Adding­
ton requested the Supreme Court to apply the Winship requirement of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt to mental health commitments. 157 
Echoing the majority's risk analysis in Winship, 158 the United States 
Supreme Court structured its opinion in Addington 159 around selecting a 
standard of proof based on the risks of an improper judicial determina­
tion. The Addington Court described society's interest in the outcome of 
judicial determinations as a continuum, with civil lawsuits between pri­
vate parties1e60 at one end and criminal cases at the other end. Some­
where in between lie the cases that are civil in nature, but whose outcome 
involves either a litigant's liberty or an allegation that he committed a 
crime such as fraud. 161 
Although the Addington Court accepted the Winship Court's propo­
sition that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is deeply rooted in 
common law tradition, it declined to follow the holding in Winship that 
the reasonable doubt standard is constitutionally mandated in this non­
criminal context: 
In a criminal case, on the other hand, the interests of the defendant 
are of such magnitude that historically and without any explicit 
merely another method of requiring that a cause of action be supported by factually 
sufficient evidence. 556 S.W.2d at 565. 
156. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 419-20 (1979) . . 
157. Id. at 427. 
158. 397 U.S. at 363-64. This risk analysis was that pronounced by the Court in Speiser v. 
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958). 
159. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion, in which all other members joined, except 
Justice Powell, who took no part in the consideration or decision in the case. 
160. "Since society has a minimal concern with the outcome of such private suits, plain­
tiffs burden of proof is a mere preponderance of the evidence. The litigants thus share the risk 
of error in roughly equal fashion." Addington, 441 U.S. at 423. 
161.  In civil cases affecting a liberty interest, the state is usually a party. The Addington 
Court gave as an example immigration and naturalization cases in which the Court has re­
quired "clear, unequivocal and convincing" evidence before deportation or denaturalization. 
441 U.S. at 424 (citing Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966); Chaunt v. United States, 364 
U.S. 350, 353 (1960); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 1 18, 125, 159 (1943)). Immi­
gration and naturalization cases are perhaps misleading in that the underlying factual issues 
are usually vague. They may provide more procedural due process than the usual civil case, 
but they provide little substantive due process. The Court proposed that cases involving alle­
gations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal activity by the defendant typify situations where 
a more rigorous standard of proof applies. While a state is certainly not prevented from re­
quiring more than a preponderance of the evidence in fraud based civil actions, the higher 
standard is not constitutionally required. Most of the civil litigation under the Racketeer In­
fluenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) has been possible because the Supreme Court has 
held that RICO violations need not be established by proof of criminal liability (proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt.) Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 491 (1985). 
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constitutional requirement they have been protected by standards 
of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of 
an erroneous judgement. In the administration of criminal justice, 
our society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself. 162 
Having established that the standard of proof is an important sym-
bol of the value society places on individual liberty, 163 -the Court then 
shifted its analysis to the value of liberty itself. The Court found that the 
value of liberty for a non-mentally ill person, who is facing potential mis­
taken confinement, is higher than the potential harm to society of not 
confining the individual. 164 Because of the possibility of mistakenly con­
fining a non-mentally ill person, the state must use a higher standard of 
proof than preponderance of the evidence. 165 
The value of individual liberty shifts, however, for a person such as 
Frank Addington, 166 who is mentally ill and who is at risk of being com­
mitted on a mistaken determination of dangerousness. In contrast to the 
non-mentally ill person, for whom commitment is a pure detriment, the 
improperly detained but nonetheless mentally ill individual might benefit 
from commitment. 167 "One who is suffering from a debilitating mental 
illness and in need of treatment is neither wholly at liberty nor free of 
stigma. . . . It cannot be said, therefore, that it is much better for a 
mentally ill person to 'go free' than for a mentally normal person to be 
committed."168 
162. Addington, 441 U.S. at 424 (citations omitted). This is reiterated at 428: 
In addition, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard historically has been reserved 
for criminal cases. This unique standard of proof, not prescribed or defined in the 
Constitution, is regarded as a critical part of the "moral force of the criminal law," 
and we should hesitate to apply it too broadly or casually in noncriminal cases (cita­
tions omitted). 
163. Id. at 425-26. The Court was frank in assessing the importance of the debate over 
standards of proof: 
Candor suggests that, to a degree, efforts to analyze what lay jurors understand con­
cerning the differences among these three tests or the nuances of a judge's instruc­
tions on the law may well be largely an academic exercise; there are no directly 
relevant empirical studies. Indeed, the ultimate truth as to how the standards of 
proof affect decisionmaking may well be unknowable, given that factfinding is a pro­
cess shared by countless thousands of individuals throughout the country. We prob­
ably can assume no more than that the difference between a preponderance of the 
evidence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt probably is better understood than 
either of them in relation to the intermediate standard of clear and convincing 
evidence. 
Id. at 424-25. 
164. Id. at 427. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 421. 
167. The Court also assumed that an erroneous commitment will probably be recognized 
and corrected. Id. at 428-29. 
168. Id. at 429. 
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This analysis, predicated on both parens patriae and public health 
rationales, underlies many prevention cases and traditional public health 
cases: restriction not only protects society, it is sometimes even beneficial 
to the restricted individual. 169 By recognizing that a civil confinement 
has potential benefits to the defendant, 170 the Addington Court destroyed 
the absolutist position of the Winship Court that there is no basis for 
distinguishing a civil commitment from a criminal prosecution. The 
Court buttressed this analysis by noting that many states that have spe­
cific standards for indefinite commitment do not use a "beyond a reason-
· 
able doubt" standard.17 1 
The Addington Court recognized that the most powerful argument 
against adopting a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for involuntary 
commitment is that psychiatric diagnosis is an inexact science. The 
Court pointed out that in criminal law cases the "reasonable doubt" stan­
dard is applied to "specific, knowable facts", 172 while psychiatric diagno­
sis is based on subjective medical impressions.173 The Court reasoned 
that if a psychiatrist could only testify to "reasonable medical 
probability", then holding jurors and judges to the "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard would result in the rejection of commitment "for many 
patients desperately in need of institutionalized psychiatric care."174 
2. Bell v. Wolfish175 
A ·companion case to Addington, Bell v. Wolfish also allowed the 
Court to distinguish regulation and punishment on sympathetic facts. 
Confinement itself was not in issue in Bell, only the conditions of the 
169. For example, The New York Family Law challenged in Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 
253 (1984), was purportedly intended to protect minors from the criminal consequences of 
their own acts. The sexually dangerous person in Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986), would 
ostensibly obtain treatment during confinement, see infra notes 292-3e19 and accompanying 
text; prostitutes picked up under health-hold orders receive treatment for venereal disease; 
children who are involuntarily vaccinated benefit from a reduced risk of contracting a commu­
nicable disease; and epileptics who are denied licenses to drive unless they are certified to be 
free of seizures benefit from not being involved in automobile accidents. Conversely, pretrial 
detainees and successful habeas corpus petitioners do not derive any benefit from detention. See 
United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986); Braunskill v. Hilton, 629 F.Supp. 5 1 1  
(D.N.J. 1986). 
170. "The State of Texas confines only for the purpose of providing care designed to treat 
the individual." Addington, 441 U.S. at 428, n.4. 
171. Id. at 430-31.  
172. Id. at 430. 
173. Id. But while mental illness and future dangerousness are certainly subjective deter­
minations, it is not so clear that questions such as the defendant's intent are specific, knowable 
facts. 
174. Id. at 430. 
175. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
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confinement. Bell arose as a challenge to the conditions in which pre­
trial detainees were confined. 176 Petitioners, who in the absence of a 
criminal adjudication were subjected to the same conditions as convicted 
criminals, claimed their confinement was unconstitutional punish­
ment. 177 The federal district court agreed that the detainees were enti­
tled to different treatment than convicted felons, holding they could only 
be deprived of liberty as a matter of compelling necessity. 178 The district 
court then reviewed each of the petitioner's claims in light of the "com­
pelling necessity" standard.e179 
The court of appeals was sensitive to the conflict between the rights 
of pretrial detainees and the needs of prison administrators. Nonetheless, 
the court found that pretrial detainees must be given the rights afforded 
unincarcerated individualse180 and stressed that pretrial detainees, as le­
gally innocent persons, are entitled to a greater protection than afforded 
by the Eight Amendment: 
[I]t is not enough that the conditions of incarceration for individu­
als awaiting trial merely comport with contemporary standards of 
decency prescribed by the cruel and unusual punishment clause of 
the eighth amendment. Time and again, we have stated without 
equivocation the indisputable rudiments of due process: pretrial 
detainees may be subjected to only those "restrictions and priva­
tions" which "inhere in their confinement itself or which are justi­
fied by compelling necessities of jail administration."181 
The court of appeals then reviewed each of the factual situations consid­
ered by the district court. 182 Although they reached different conclu­
sions on the constitutionality of certain situations, 183 the district court 
and the court of appeals agreed that it is constitutionally impermissible 
to subject pretrial detainees to the same conditions as convicted prison­
ers. The lower courts' reasoning that the presumed innocence of pretrial 
176. Id. at 523. See United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F.Supp. 1 14 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977). 
177. Bell at 527. 
178. The district court found that because they were "presumed to be innocent and held 
only to ensure their presence at trial, 'any deprivation or restriction of . . .  rights beyond those 
which are necessary for confinement alone, must be justified by a compelling necessity.'e" U.S. 
ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi at 124 (quoting Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention v. Malcolm, 
520 F.2d 392, 397 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
179. U.S. ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi at 124-65. 
180. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 1 18, 124 (2d. Cir. 1978). 
181 .  Id. (citing Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 1974)). 
182. "In actuality, we have here decided not one, but twenty cases relating to specific con­
ditions at the MCC." Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d at 133. 
183. See, e.g., id. at 126 (double celling); 130 (telephone privileges); 132 (right to possess a 
typewriter). 
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detainees requires a finding of necessity before they can be confined 184 is 
compatible with the concerns expressed in Gault and Winship that per­
sons not be deprived of liberty without due process of law. 
Yet Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Supreme Court185 rejected 
this reasoning, stating that the presumption of innocence "has no appli­
cation to a determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee during con­
finement before his trial has even begun."e186 More broadly, the Supreme 
Court held that the presumption of innocence has little significance 
outside of a criminal trial.e187 
The Supreme Court's determination that innocence does not entitle 
a detainee to better treatment stems from its analysis of detention versus 
punishment. 188 Rejecting the Winship standard that all detentions are 
punishments, 189 the Supreme Court found: 
Once the Government has exercised its conceded authority to de­
tain a person pending trial, it obviously is entitled to employ de­
vices that are calculated to effectuate this detention. Traditionally, 
this has meant confinement in a facility which, no matter how 
modem or antiquated, results in restricting the movement of a de­
tainee in a manner in which he would not be restricted if he simply 
were free to walk the streets pending trial. . . . And the fact that 
such detention interferes with the detainee's understandable desire 
to live as comfortably as possible . . .  during confinement does not 
convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into 
"punishment." 190 
Public health jurisprudence has always accepted that detention to 
protect the general welfare is not constitutionally impermissible punish­
ment. 191 If detention is not punishment, then an individual may be de­
tained without full due process protections. 192 By basing its holding on 
a finding that detention related to criminal law violations is not necessar­
ily punishment, the Bell Court prepared the way for later determinations 
that individuals may be detained to protect the public from criminal 
activity. 193 
184. "Neither respondents nor the courts below question that the Government may per­
missibly detain a person suspected of committing a crime prior to a formal adjudication of 
guilt." Bell, 441 U.S. at 534. 
185. 441 U.S. 520. Rehnquist's majority opinion, was joined by four justices, with Justice 
Powell concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
186. Id. at 533. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 535. 
189. Winship, 397 U.S. at 365. 
190. Bell, 441 U.S. at 537. 
191.  See In re Martin, 83 Cal. App. 2d 164, 188 P.2d 287 (1948). 
192. Bell, 441 U.S. at 536. 
193. See infra note 416-20 and accompanying text. 
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In Bell, the Supreme Court reinforced the parallel of criminal deten­
tion and traditional public health jurisprudence by stressing that courts 
should accord great deference to "expert" prison administrators. 194 The 
Bell court recognized that prison officials, like health officers, sometimes 
are experts only by statutory title, 195 but argued that actual expertise is 
not the only basis for judicial deference. There is also a structural re­
quirement for such deference, in that "the operation of our correctional 
facilities is peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive 
Branches of our Government, not the Judicial."e196 This echoes the 
courts' assertions that public health decisions are to be made by legisla­
tures and not by courts. 
The Bell Court adopted a simple test for the bounds of administra­
tive discretion: "It is enough to say that they have not been conclusively 
shown to be wrong . . .  "197 This deference to expert decision making was 
carried to its logical extreme in Barefoot v. Estelle, 198 where the Court 
allowed experts to decide whether a prisoner should live or die. Yet, 
while Barefoot is extreme as to the reach of expert discretion, the expert 
decisionmaker did not become involved until after a conviction with full 
due process protections. It was left to later cases to allow an expert to 
confine a defendant without a criminal conviction. 
3. Barefoot v. Estelle199 
Barefoot v. Estelle, a death penalty appeal arising from a case de­
cided by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,200 represents an extreme 
case of restricting an individual's liberty for the safety of society.201 
Barefoot is a prevention case because the underlying substantive issue 
was whether Texas had proved that Thomas Barefoot was so dangerous 
to society as to merit the death penalty.202 The trial court used the "be­
yond a reasonable doubt" standard, which is constitutionally required in 
194. "Prison administrators therefore should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the 
adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve 
internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." Bell, 441 U.S. at 547. 
195. "We further observe that, on occasion, prison administrators may be 'experts' only by 
Act of Congress or of a state legislature." Id. at 548. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 555 (citing Jones v North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 1 19, 132 
(1976)). 
198. See infra subsection 3. 
199. 463 U.S. 880, reh'g denied, 464 U.S. 874 (1983). 
200. Barefoot v. State, 596 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Crim. 1980), reh 'g denied. At the time this 
case was heard, the Court of Criminal Appeals was the court of last resort for criminal cases in 
Texas. 
201. This discussion is not meant to endorse the Supreme Court's decision in Barefoot. 
202. Barefoot v. State, 463 U.S. at 888. 
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criminal adjudications.e203 However, this provided scant protection for 
Barefoot because the state was only required to prove that there was 
some "probability" that Barefoot posed a risk of future dangerousness. 204 
In effect, the state's burden of proof was so slight that Barefoot could 
have been put to death as a regulatory restriction. 205 
Barefoot had burned down a bar and then shot and killed a police 
officer investigating the arson. The jury convicted him of capital murder 
of a police officer. After the conviction phase of the trial, the same jury 
heard evidence on the question of whether Barefoot should be put to 
death.206 To sentence a person to death in Texas, the state must show: 1) 
that the killing was intentional;207 2) that it was without reasonable prov­
ocation;208 and 3) that the defendant poses a threat of future dangerous­
ness. 209 The state must prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt to satisfy traditional procedural due process concerns. 210 
The state relied on psychiatric testimony to establish future danger­
ousness, calling two psychiatrists, Drs. John Holbrook and James Grig­
son, to testify at the punishment stage of the trial. Each doctor was 
posed a hypothetical fact situation based on the evidence in the case and 
asked if the individual described in that question would probably commit 
future acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to soci­
ety. Each doctor testified that, in his opinion, the hypothetical criminal 
would continue to be dangerous.e211 In addition to this expert testimony, 
numerous lay witnesses testified that "appellant's reputation in their 
203. TEXAS CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981), requires that the jury 
find: "(c) The state must prove each issue submitted beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury 
shall return a special verdict of 'yes' or 'no' on each issue submitted." 
204. "Appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to define 'probability' in its 
charge to the jury at the punishment stage of the trial. This Court has previously held that 
such a definition is not required." Barefoot v. State, 596 S.W.2d at 887. 
205. This case only applies to persons convicted of capital murder. Conversely, under 
Texas law a capital murderer may not be put to death unless the state can establish future 
dangerousness. By allowing Texas to use a regulatory standard of proof for this determination, 
the Supreme Court is endorsing regulatory executions. 
206. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. at 883-84 & n.e1. 
207. TEXAS CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981), requires that the jury 
find: "(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was 
committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or 
another would result." 
208. TEXAS CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 37.071 (Vernon 198e1), requires that the jury 
find: "(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the de­
ceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased." 
209. TEXAS CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981), requires that the jury 
find: "(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of 
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society". 
210. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
211 .  Barefoot v. State, 596 S.W.2d at 887. 
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communities for being a peaceful and law-abiding citizen was bad."212 
The judge then sentenced Barefoot to death. 
In his appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, the defendant raised 
several questions about the conduct of his trial.e213 The issue that is cen­
tral to the jurisprudence of prevention is the effect of the term 
"probability" in the test for future dangerousness. Defendant argued 
that this term should have been defined in the jury instructions.214 In 
addition, defendant asserted that, since they had not examined him, the 
psychiatrists should have been precluded from testifying in response to a 
general hypothetical. 215 He also questioned the qualifications of psychia­
trists as a group to p�edict dangerousness.216 The Court of Criminal Ap­
peals rejected all of appellant's points of error.217 
The United States Supreme Court also rejected the defendant's chal­
lenge that psychiatrists as a group are incompetent to determine danger­
ousness to a sufficient degree of certainty.218 The Court reasoned that 
psychiatrists are no less reliable than laypersons, and that lay testimony 
is sufficient to establish future dangerousness.e219 The Court addressed 
the issue of the degree of accuracy necessary for determining 
dangerousness: 
Dr. John Monahan, upon whom one of the State's experts relied as 
"the leading thinker on this issue" concluded that "the 'best' 
clinical research currently in existence indicates that psychiatrists 
and psychologists are accurate in no more than one out of three 
predictions of violent behavior over a several-year period among 
institutionalized populations that had both committed violence in 
212. Id. at 888. 
213. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeal noted: 
Appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury at the 
guilt-innocence stage of the trial on the law of circumstantial evidence, denying his 
motion for change of venue, overruling his challenges for cause of three prospective 
jurors, refusing his request for additional peremptory challenges, admitting evidence 
of extraneous offenses, failing to define "probability" in the charge at the punishment 
stage, and overruling his objections to the testimony of two witnesses as to the 
probability he would commit acts of violence in the fut,ure. Appellant also contends 
that art. 37.071, V.A.C.C.P., is unconstitutionally vague. 
Id. at 878. 
214. The Court of Criminal Appeals, relying on King v. State, 553 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1977), affirmed the trial court's refusal to give an instruction defining probability. 596 
S.W.2d at 878. 
215. Id. at 887. In his appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the defendant also attacked the 
authority of psychiatrists to determine future dangerousness. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896-97. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 889: "The evidence that we have already summarized in this opinion is amply 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict and the court did not err in overruling appellant's mo­
tion for an instructed verdict." 
218. Id. at 896-97. 
219. Id. (citing with approval Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-76 (1976)). 
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the past . . .  and who were diagnosed as mentally ill."220 
The Court pointed out that Dr. Monahan did believe there were 
circumstances in which prediction is "empirically possible and ethically 
appropriate,"221 but it is difficult to accept that the determination in 
Barefoot would fit these circumstances.222 The experts did not even ex­
amine defendant, but instead rendered their opinions based on hypotheti­
cal questions. 223 The Court held that the use of hypothetical questions to 
establish future dangerousness is proper224 because the admissibility of 
such testimony is supported by the Federal Rules of Evidence. 225 The 
Court refused to find that death penalty cases po� special evidentiary 
problems. 226 The Court's approach imposed upon the defendant the 
harsh burden of convincing a lay jury227 to disregard the expert testi­
mony of the state's psychiatrists. 228 
220. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 899-900 n.7 (citing "Tr. of Hearing" at 195 (quoting J. 
MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47-49 (198e1)) (emphasis in 
original). The United States Supreme Court found the issue of the proper standard of proof 
for future dangerousness to be of secondary importance. In the Court's view, the primary 
issue was whether the handling of the habeas corpus petition in this death penalty case had 
been proper. Most of the Supreme Court's opinion is concerned with "the question presented 
by the application, namely, the appropriate standard for granting or denying a stay of execu­
tion pending disposition of an appeal by a federal court of appeals by a death-sentenced federal 
habeas corpus petitioner . . . . " Id. at 887 (quoting Barefoot, 459 U.S. 1 169 (1983)). 
221. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 889-901 n.7. 
222. "Doctor Grigson . . .  has been used by the state of Texas for dozens of sentencing 
hearings in death penalty cases and virtually each time had testified that the defendant was 
incorrigibly dangerous, thus permitting them to be sentenced to death. Texas newspapers 
have labeled him 'Doctor Death.'e" Reuters News Service, May 18, 1981 .  
223. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 885. 
224. Id. at 903 (citing Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645, 657 (1879) (use of hypothetical 
questions in place of testimony based on expert's personal evaluation of evidence is proper)). 
225. 463 U.S. at 904. 
226. "Although cases such as this involve the death penalty, we perceive no constitutional 
barrier to applying the ordinary rules of evidence governing the use of expert testimony." Id. 
227. Texas provides indigents $500 for the costs of investigation and engaging expert wit­
nesses. Id. at 899 n.5. At the time the Barefoot case was originally tried, the "going rate" in 
-Texas for preparation and trial testimony exceeded $1500 for a physician expert. 
228. See Justice Blackmun's dissent for a detailed analysis of the· problems in refuting 
pseudo-scientific testimony. Id. at 916-38. The United States Supreme Court acknowledged 
the danger of expert testimony in Satterwhite v. Texas, 108 S. Ct. 1792, 1796 (1988): 
The controversy in Estelle v. Smith [45 1 U.S. 454 (1981)] also centered on the expert 
testimony of Dr. James P. Grigson. In that case, as in this, Dr. Grigson appeared as 
a witness for the State in a capital sentencing proceeding and testified that the de­
fendant was a severe sociopath who would continue to commit violent crimes in the 
future. He based his testimony upon a psychiatric examination of the defendant that 
he had conducted pursuant to court order. The problem in the case was that defense 
counsel were not given advance notice that Dr. Grigson's psychiatric examination, 
encompassing the issue of their client's future dangerousness, would take place. We 
recognized that, for a defendant charged with a capital crime, the decision whether to 
submit to a psychiatric examination designed to determine his future dangerousness 
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Barefoot is an extreme example of judicial deference to expert deci­
sionmaking. The Texas legislature avoided due process challenges to its 
death penalty guidelines by preserving the facade that a jury may only 
recommend death after determining beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant posed a future danger, 229 while, in reality, an expert deter­
mines "whether there is a probability" that the defendant will be danger­
ous in the future.230 Since, on the face of the statute, any probability 
would do, it is the expert who effectively decides whether the defendant 
is dangerous enough to die. The jury only decides whether it believes the 
expert. Thus, "beyond a reasonable doubt" is transformed into an "any 
evidence at all" standard.231 
Putting aside the policy that death penalty cases deserve special 
standards, 232 Barefoot allows a person to be put to death on little more233 
than a chance that he or she poses a threat to society.234 While this is an 
extreme result, it may nonetheless be rational. The issue of future dan­
gerousness is not reached until the defendant is convicted with full due 
process protections of capital murder. Constitutionally, Texas could sen­
tence the defendant to death without further findings. Instead, it re­
quires the defendant's life to be balanced against the potential threat that 
he or she poses to society. Balancing individual liberty against potential 
is "literally a life or death matter" which the defendant should not be required to face 
without "the guiding hand of counsel." 
Id. (quoting Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. at 471 (quoting Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694, 708 (5th 
Cir. 1979) and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932))). 
229. TEXAS CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981), quoted in Barefoot, 463 
U.S. at 883-84 n.1. 
230. Barefoot, 416 U.S. at 9 16-19. 
231. Barefoot had not been convicted of any crimes of violence in the past. There w;is 
testimony that he had broken out of jail in New Mexico where he was being held on charges of 
sexual assault. The state also presented witnesses to his bad character, but they testified as to 
general character, rather than specific events that would allow the jury to independently evalu­
ate Barefoot's proclivities. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 917 (Blackmun, J., dissenting.) 
232. Justice Blackmun's dissent refers to Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 
(1976) as a statement of the traditional policy for death penalty determinations: 
Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term 
differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is 
a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death 
is the appropriate punishment in a specific case. 
Id. at 924 (Blackmun, J., dissenting (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305)). 
233. While the jury must answer yes to three special issues to trigger the imposition of the 
death penalty, two of these issues are also elements of capital murder. These elements would 
already have been established in the determination of guilt phase of the trial. See Barefoot, 463 
U.S. at 916-17 n. l (Blackmum, J., dissenting). 
234. "In a capital case, the specious testimony of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an 
impressionable jury by the inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist's words, equates 
with death itself." Id. at 916. 
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harm to society is the fundamental expert determination in public health 
jurisprudence. 
Harsh as the result in Barefoot is, the expert decision making oc­
curred only after a full criminal trial. In the subsequent prevention 
cases, beginning with Schall v. Martin, the Supreme Court extended the 
role of the expert to the determination of whether a person should be 
confined at all. These cases have erased the bright line between danger­
ousness based on criminal activity and dangerousness based on health 
and safety concerns. The Supreme Court based its abandonment of this 
traditional distinction on the application a societal self-defense analysis. 
4. Schall v. Martin235 
Schall established the acceptability of detentions based on the dis­
cretion of an expert decision maker.236 By limiting its holdings to 
juveniles, who have historically not been granted full constitutional pro­
tection, the Court was able to assert the right to detain individuals to 
prevent future crimes without great controversy. 
In United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg,237 the district court 
confronted both the constitutional basis for a determination of danger­
ousness and the theory of regulatory versus punitive detention. The case 
arose from a class action habeas corpus petition brought "on behalf of a 
class of all juveniles who are being held or who will be held before these 
proceedings are concluded in pretrial detention under New York Family 
Court Act § 739(a)(ii)."238 
Three named petitioners participated in the trial on the merits, and 
the records of thirty-three other detainees were introduced into evi­
dence.239 Many of the petitioners were detained on suspicion of serious 
crimes. 240 The habeas corpus petition challenged the constitutionality of 
235. 467 U.S. 253 (1984). 
236. Although Schall established the state's right to detain juveniles prior to an adjudica­
tion of guilt or delinquency, it did not directly overrule Winship or Gault. The Schall Court 
moved away from the emphasis on due process protections to a regulatory model for detention. 
See infra notes 277-81 and accompanying text. 
237. 513  F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
238. Id. at 693. While the detentions were of a short duration, jurisdiction was granted 
based on a recurring violation theory. 
239. Id. at 694. 
240. Edwin Rodriguez was arrested . . .  and charged with arson and reckless endan­
germent . . . .  
Juan Santiago, 12 years old . . .  was arrested . . .  and charged with first degree 
assault on a 71 year old woma)l. . . . 
_ 
Jerome Basnight, 14 years old, was arrested . . .  and charged with first degree 
robbery and criminal possession of a weapon . . .  . 
Johnny McArthur, age 15 was arrest�d . . .  for pointing a loaded, cocked auto-
matic at a 13 year old . . . .  
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the New York law allowing the preventive detention of minors.241 The 
New York statute provided that the state could detain a minor, if, in the 
judge's discretion, it appeared that there was a substantial probability 
that the minor would not return on the court date, or that the minor 
would commit an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult. 242 
The judge's determination was based on the intake probation officer's 
report243 and the judge's own evaluation and experience.244 
The petitioners alleged that the statute violated the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,245 contending 
that the judge's discretion under section 739 was so broad as to be arbi­
trary. 246 They also contended that the statute treated juveniles differ­
ently from adults, thus violating their right to equal protection. 247 The 
district court addressed three issues: 1) whether the detention of juveniles 
is punishment or a regulatory action;248 2) whether detention without a 
full adversary proceeding violates due process considerations;249 and 3) 
Christopher Cox, 13, Glen Maloney, 13, and Wade Forde, 13, were ar­
rested . . .  along with Clarence Smith, 13, and Alex Michael, 15, and charged with 
grabbing and threatening people with a weapon in an attempt to take their bus 
passes. 
Id. at 695-97. The remainder of the petitioners were arrested under similar circumstances. See 
id. at 695-700. 
241. N.Y. Family Court Act § 739; see Mart�n, 513 F. Supp. at 694, n.2. 
242. The statute in question, N.Y. Family Court Act § 739, provided: 
(a) After the filing of a petition under section seven hundred thirty-one or seven 
hundred thirty-two, the court in its discretion may release the respondent or direct 
his detention. In exercising its discretion under this section, the court shall not direct 
detention unless it finds that unless the respondent is detained: 
(i) there is a substantial probability that he will not appear in court on the re­
turn date; or 
(ii) there is serious risk that he may before the return date do an act which if 
committed by an adult would constitute a crime. 
Id. 
243. The intake probation officer must have a master's degree in social work, sociology or 
related fields, or a bachelor's degree, plus two years of paid-for experience in social work and 
related fields. The probation officer interviews the juvenile for ten .to forty minutes and investi­
gates the arrest record. The officer may either 'adjust' the case (defer a decision) or refer it to 
the court with recommendations. See 513 F. Supp. at 701. 
244. In deciding whether juveniles should be detained, each judge must rely on his or her 
own subjective judgment, based on the limited information available at court intake and 
whatever personal standards the judge has developed in exercising discretionary authority 
under the statute. Id. at 702. 
245. Id. at 704. 
246. Id. Petitioners argued that the subjective prediction of future misconduct, which 
§ 739(a)(ii) authori�ed as the basis for the pretrial detention of juveniles was a vague, arbitrary, 
and capricious standard and that no rational prediction was possible under the statutory 
scheme. Id. 
247. Id. at 704. 
248. Id. at 705. 
249. Id. at 707. 
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whether it is proper for a judge to make a determination of future dan­
gerousness without either detailed standards or expert testimony.250 
The district court focused its inquiry on the character of the deten­
tion involved-physical confinement-rather than on the legislative in­
tent behind the statute. The court reasoned that a state cannot 
preemptorily label a statute as regulatory regardless of its actual effect on 
the detained individual.251 In this case the court was persuaded that the 
stigmatization associated with incarceration amounted to punishment. 252 
This broad view of punishment is rooted in Supreme Court precedent: 
It would be archaic to limit the definition of 'punishment' to 'retri­
bution.' Punishment serves several purposes: retributive, rehabili­
tative, deterrent and preventive. One of the reasons society 
imprisons those convicted of crimes is to keep them from inflicting 
future harm, but that does not make imprisonment any the less , 
punishment."253 
Once the district court determined that the statute imposed a criminal 
sanction through a civil proceeding, it was inexorably driven to conclude 
that "pretrial detention without a prior adjudication of probable cause is, 
itself, a per se violation of due process."254 
The court was most concerned with the latitude that the statute 
gave a judge in determining whether to detain an individual.255 The 
court heard extensive testimony on the hazards of predicting future dan­
gerousness256 and concluded that dangerousness cannot be predicted 
with any "acceptable degree of accuracy."257 Adopting public health 
250. Id. 
251. "The state cannot escape the obviously punitive nature of detention under § 739 by 
labelling the statute 'preventive' and 'regulatory,' since 'even a clear legislative classification of 
a statute as "non-penal" would not alter the fundamental nature of a plainly penal statute.' " 
Id. at 716 (citations omitted). 
252. "However, 'punishment' is not limited to deprivations based on having committed a 
specific, identifiable crime. It is sufficient if the person is stigmatized as disreputable in a man­
ner closely analogous to the process that occurs upon a formal finding of criminal guilt." Id. 
253. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965). 
254. 513 F.Supp. at 707. 
255. The first defect [the vagueness of the statute] is perhaps the most pernicious. The 
judge is empowered to make a prediction about the probability of an individual com­
mitting a crime if released. No guidelines for making that determination are set out 
in the statute, and none has been adopted by the court. The judge's determination is 
moored to no concrete or reasonably determinable yardsticks . . . .  The whole process 
is riddled with subjectivity and caprice and confers upon the judge 'a license for 
arbitrary procedure.' 
Id. (citation omitted). 
256. Id. at 709-1 1  nn.31-32. 
257. Id. at 709. 
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metaphors,258 the court expressed concern that predictions of future dan­
gerousness tend to overinclusiveness, so that there are too many "false 
positives."259 After examining the evidence presented by clinical260 and 
statistical261 methods of predicting future dangerousness, the court found 
it unreasonable to accept that a family court judge, whose only informa­
tion is derived from the accused's brief appearance before the court, can 
determine future behavior.262 
The more difficult issue was whether the district court would accept 
a properly qualified professional decision made in the peremptory man­
ner that is mandated by the circumstances of a juvenile detention hear­
ing. 263 Not only would it be expensive to make detailed investigations of 
each detainee, it would also take considerable time to make a particular­
ized determination in each case involving testing and interviewing the 
detainee, collecting background information, and conferring with social 
workers.264 If, during this time, the state were to keep the juvenile in 
custody, it would be with even less procedural protection than the statute 
at issue provided. If the juvenile were not detained, he or she might 
commit more crimes or fail to appear before the court.265 The court did 
not address these state concerns, but instead attacked the very notion of 
258. While the Court used public health terms to describe the problems of an imperfect 
screening system, it ignored the risk to society of crimes committed by persons awaiting adju­
dication. Despite the "false positives," a public health analysis, as conducted later by the 
Supreme Court, would find this an acceptable risk-benefit ratio. See Schall, 467 U.S. at 278-79 
& n.30. 
259. 513 F. Supp. at 709. 
260. "Clinical methods rely on the use of trained psychiatric or social science staff, at­
tempting a 'wide band procedure in which a broad range of information about the individual is 
gathered from sources such as interviews, social history, and projective testing.'e" Id. at 71 1 .  
261. "In statistical prediction, the individual is, in effect, classified in terms of the presence 
or absence of the predictor variables. Given the classification, the frequencies of behaviors can 
be concluded for persons belonging to the same class.'' Id. at 712 (citation omitted). 
262. Id. 
263. If the juvenile is in custody, he must be brought before a judge within 24 hours. The 
judge may postpone the § 739 hearing for an additional 24 hours. If the juvenile is detained, a 
fact-finding hearing (equivalent to a trial on the merits) must be heard within 14 days, and 
usually three to six days. The judge makes a determination at the hearing based on the testi­
mony presented. In many cases there is no one present with personal knowledge of the alleged 
crime. Id. at 702. 
264. See id. at 71e1-12. 
265. Id. at 713. Paroling the juvenile during a determination of future dangerousness was 
particularly nettlesome to the district court: 
What seems to be the most patently arbitrary action, however, occurs in those 
cases in which the juvenile is paroled to the custody of his parents or guardians after 
the incident, has been home on parole ranging in the case histories in this record 
from roughly 5 days to over a month prior to the § 739 hearing, and even though 
there is no showing of any other infraction while on parole, the judge nonetheless 
orders remand purportedly because there is a risk that the juvenile will commit a new 
crime before he is tried on the instant offense. Whatever meager rationale may exist 
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detention, assailing the premise that future dangerousness can be pre­
dicted. 266 This line of argument implies that the detention of minors is 
constitutionally permissible, even if based on particularized determina­
tions of future dangerousness. 267 
In affirming the district court's decision, the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit predicated its analysis on the assumption that "[t]he 
presumption of innocence and the requirement that guilt be proven be­
yond a reason doubt are important elements of Due Process itself 
• • • •  "268 Although a focus on the presumption of innocence usually leads 
to an absolute prohibition on pretrial detention, the court of appeals in 
this case examined the evidence on the relationship between detention 
and eventual adjudication. The court accepted defendant's assertions 
that at least two-thirds of all persons detained pursuant to section 739 
were eventually released without being sentenced to additional detention 
as a punishment and therefore should not have been detained at all. 269 
The appeals court held that this limited congruence between final adjudi­
cation and preventive detention failed to prove a compelling government 
interest in pretrial detention, and that the statute was unconstitutional: 
Our decision is strictly limited to the precise issue before us. We 
hold only that pre-trial detention may not be imposed for anti­
crime purposes pursuant to substantively and procedurally unlim­
ited statutory authority when, in all likelihood, most detainees will 
either not be adjudicated guilty or will not be sentenced to confine-
· ment after an adjudication of guilt. 270 
The appeals court found that the detention served as a "punishment 
imposed without proof of guilt established according to the requisite con­
stitutional standard."271 
in other situations . . .  remand is wholly unjustified and unsupportable in these cir­
cumstances . . . .  " 
Id. 
266. The literature generally agrees that no reliable method of predicting dangerous­
ness, whether clinical or actuarial in nature, exists at this time . . . .  
Thus, it is clear that juveniles who are subjected to § 739 detention have their 
freedom curtailed by judgments that are untrustworthy and uninformed and without 
the requisite rationality which due process mandates. 
Id. at 712. 
267. The District Court handed down its decision before Barefoot, which endorsed deter­
minations of future dangerousness. See supra subsection 3. 
268. Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)). 
269. The Court of Appeals accepted defendant's assertions that there were three classes of 
detainees for whom detention was not warranted: 1) persons eventually released without adju­
dication; 2) persons detained qn mistaken information; and 3) persons later adjudicated guilty 
but released for time served. Martin v. Strasburg at 373. 
270. Id. at 374. 
271. Id. In contrast to the absolutist position of the district court, the appeals court did not 
strike the statute for vagueness. 
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The Supreme Court reviewed the court of appeals decision in Schall 
v. Martin, 272 and considered the question of "fundamental fairness" 
under the Due Process Clause in this context, focusing on two questions: 
"First, does preventive detention under the New York statute serve a 
legitimate state objective?"273 "And, second, are the procedural safe­
guards contained in the FCA [Family Court Act] adequate to authorize 
the pretrial detention of at least some juveniles charged with a crime?" 
The first question effectively transfof111ed the lower courts' terminology 
of "pre-trial detention" and "compelling governmental interest"274 into 
"preventive detention"275 and "legitimate state objective."276 As a re­
sult, the Court shifted the analysis away from the criminal context and 
toward public health concepts and tests. 
The Supreme Court quickly defused the issue of punishment with­
out adjudication by stressing that minors may benefit when the state pro­
vides detention and thus 'protect[s] the juvenile from his own folly.'277 
The Court indirectly addressed the legitimacy of the state's interest in 
pretrial detention by referring to "[t]he 'legitimate and compelling state 
interest' in protecting the community from crime . . .  .''278 This interest 
is not diminished by the age of the offender, but may in fact be enhanced 
by the high rate of recidivism among juveniles. 279 The Supreme Court 
bolstered its reasoning by reference to the large number of states that 
have adopted preventive detention for minors. 280 With this commentary 
the Supreme Court completely transformed the District Court's absolute 
rejection of the statute as punishment without due process into a ques­
tion of balancing the right of society to protect itself against the right of a 
minor to engage in youthful folly. As a balancing question, the Supreme 
Court hel� that the statute provided for an allowable regulatory 
272. 467 U.S. 253 (1984). 
273. Id. at 263-264. 
274. Strasburg, 689 F.2d at 373. 
275. Schall at 263. 
276. Id. at 264. 
277. Id. at 265 (citation omitted). 
278. Id. at 264. The Court also referred to the "weighty social objective" of crime control. 
Id. 
279. Id. at 264-65. 
280. Id. at 266-67 n.16. The Court did not find that wide usage in itself is determinative of 
whether a practice satisfies due process requirements. Wide usage does, however, rebut the 
argument that the practice in question does not offend " 'some principle of justice so rooted in 
" the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' Id. at 268 
(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). 
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detention. 281 
The critical feature in Schall that characterizes it as a prevention 
case is the statute's broad grant of authority to expert decision makers, 
who determine whether an individual should be detained. The District 
Court, accepting extensive expert testimony on the appropriateness and 
accuracy of predictions of future dangerousness, concluded that these de­
terminations are inherently arbitrary, and held therefore that the statute 
was an unconstitutional delegation of authority.282 The Supreme Court 
rejected these evidentiary attacks on the propriety of determinations of 
future criminal conduct: 
Our cases indicate . . .  that from a legal point of view there is noth­
ing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal 
conduct. Such a judgment forms an important element in many 
decisions, and we have specifically rejected the contention, based 
on the same sort of sociological data relied upon by appellees and 
the District Court, "that it is impossible to predict future behavior 
and that the question is so vague as to be meaningless."283 
The Supreme Court found that it is precisely this difficulty in deter­
mining future criminal conduct that justifies granting the judge broad 
authority. 284 The Court's balancing of uncertainty turns the trial court's 
analysis on its head: controversy over the methodology for determining 
future criminal conduct was found to validate a vague law rather than 
undermine it. Rejecting sociological evidence that the judges' decisions 
could not be made correctly, the Supreme Court deferred to the judge as 
expert decision maker. Although this reasoning is consistent with public 
health jurisprudence, in which a health officer's decision or act in the face 
of uncertainty is acceptable, an analogous delegation of decision making 
power is anathema in the criminal law context. 
The Supreme Court's finding that the state may regulate individual 
behavior in the face of controversy over the scientific basis for that regu­
lation underscores an important distinction between the jurisprudence of 
prevention and the jurisprudence of individual liberties developed in 
criminal law. Criminal law demands proof beyond reasonable doubt, but 
science seldom provides answers to sociologic problems that can with­
stand a "beyond a reasonable doubt" analysis. Even issues as clear as the 
value of childhood immunizations are endlessly debated-yet few would 
281. Schall, 467 U.S. at 274. Preventive detention serves the legitimate state objective, held 
in common with every state in the country, of protecting both the juvenile and society from the 
hazards of pretrial crime. 
282. 513 F.Supp. at 707. 
283. Schall, 467 U.S. at 278-79 (footnotes and citations omitted); see also supra notes 185-
87 and accompanying text. 
284. 467 U.S. at 279-80. 
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argue that this debate should be allowed to interfere with the involuntary 
immunization of children. 285 
The Supreme Court's satisfaction with the statute's procedural pro­
tections is another parallel to public health jurisprudence. The Court 
found that the statute in Schall provided for notice, a hearing, and a 
statement of facts prior to detention. 286 Although these procedural pro­
tections are rudimentary in nature, 287 the majority found them satisfac­
tory, dismissing the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the proceedings 
were too brief to allow appeal through habeas corpus. 288 The Supreme 
Court determined that the record provided at the hearing, combined with 
the right of appeal to the New York Supreme Court, made it reasonable 
to consider habeas corpus a part of the protections in a section 320 deten­
tion. 289 This reliance on habeas corpus for "correcting on a case-by-case 
basis any erroneous detentions . . .  "290 reflects the public health empha­
sis on procedural flexibility,291 rather than the criminal law emphasis on 
certainty and procedural regularity. 
Detailed procedural safeguards cost time and money. When the 
concern is prevention of future harm, these costs limit the state's ability 
to act. A prevention analysis starts with the premise that there are some 
circumstances in which procedural protections are incompatible with so­
cietal self-defense. The simplest example would be a police action to in-
285. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 
1 1, 28-29 (1905), the Supreme Court noted: 
If the mode adopted by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for the protection of its 
local communities against smallpox proved to be distressing, inconvenient or objec­
tionable to some-if nothing more could be reasonably affirmed of the statute in 
question-the answer is that it was the duty of the constituted authorities primarily 
to keep in view the welfare, comfort and safety of the many, and not permit the 
interests of the many to be subordinated to the wishes or convenience of the few. 
286. Schall, 467 U.S. at 275. 
287. Id. at 283-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
288. Id. at 281; see Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d at 374. 
289. Schall, 467 U.S. at 281. 
290. Id. 
291. See In re Halko, 246 Cal. App. 2d 553, 558, 54 Cal. Rptr. 661, 664 (1966) ("[A] 
person quarantined without reasonable grounds is entitled to relief by habeas corpus.") How­
ever, in In re Arata, 52 Cal. App. 380, 383, 198 P. 814 (1921), the court was careful to point 
out that the issue is a factual one: 
That the health authorities possess the power to place under quarantine restrictions 
persons whom they have reasonable cause to believe are affiicted with infectious or 
contagious diseases coming within the definition set forth in Political Code, section 
2979a, as a general right, may not be questioned. It is equally true that in the exer­
cise of this unusual power, which infringes upon the right of liberty of the individual, 
personal restraint can only be imposed where, under the facts as brought within the 
knowledge of the health authorities, reasonable ground exists to support the belief 
that the person is affiicted as claimed; and as to whether such order is justified will 
depend upon the facts of each individual case. 
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terrupt a violent crime in progress: the police are not required to have a 
probable cause hearing before breaking up a bank robbery that is in pro­
gress. They do not need to obtain a warrant before shooting a person 
who is shooting at them. There is universal agreement that imposing 
procedural requirements in these circumstances would make it impossi­
ble to prevent the threatened harm. Conversely, a criminal law analysis 
starts with cold facts: the crime has been committed. There is no ur­
gency for action. Unlike the crime in progress, there is uncertainty about 
the guilt of the accused. While the expense of procedural protections 
may still be troublesome, the delay is not crippling. 
The prevention cases assume that the violent crime in progress is 
one extreme in a continuum bf situations in which the probability of 
harm is great enough to outweigh the benefits of full due process 
protections. 
5. Allen v. Illinois292 
The Supreme Court in Allen v. Illinois further refined the regulatory 
detention punitive incarceration dichotomy. Allen was a criminal action, 
but the statute at issue also provided for indefinite civil detention in a 
maximum security prison. 293 The defendant protested that his detention 
was a punishment imposed without proper due process, and in particular 
that the statute did not protect the accused's privilege against self-incrim­
ination. 294 The Supreme Court found that the detention was regulatory, 
not punitive. 295 Because the need for accurate factfinding is critical to 
regulatory detentions, the Court rejected defendant's complaint that he 
was forced to incriminate himself. 296 
Terry Allen was accused of hiding in a woman's car, forcing her to 
drive him to a "romantic place," and then forcing her to have sexual 
relations with him. The victim was able to escape without further in­
jury. 297 The State of Illinois charged Allen with the crimes of unlawful 
restraint and deviate sexual assault.298 While the charges were pending, 
the state moved to declare Allen a sexually dangerous person under the 
Illinois law that provided for the indefinite civil commitment of such 
292. 478 U.S. 364 (1986). 
293. Id. at 369; and see infra note 299. 
294. Allen v. Illinois at 370. 
295. Id. at 374. 
296. Id. at 375. 
297. People v. Allen, 107 Ill.2d 91, 481 N.E.2d 690, 693-94 (1985): 
298. 481 N.E.2d at 692. 
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persons. 299 
After a bench trial, an Illinois judge determined that Allen was a 
sexually dangerous person300 and remanded him to the Menard Psychiat­
ric Center, a maximum security facility. 301 Reviewing Allen's appeal, the 
Illinois Supreme Court identified three questions for decision: 1)  Are 
Miranda warnings required before a defendant is examined .by a psychia­
trist pursuant to a court order in a sexually dangerous person proceed­
ing? 2) Did the defendant waive any applicable privilege against self­
incrimination? 3) Did the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was a sexually dangerous person as defined by the statute?302 
The Illinois Supreme Court, relying on People v. Pembrock303 and 
People v. English, 304 found that a proceeding to have a person committed 
under the sexually dangerous person statute was civil in nature, 305 and 
that in a civil proceeding there is no constitutional requirement that the 
defendant be given Miranda warnings. 306 The court found that there was 
no privilege against self-incrimination in a sexually dangerous person 
proceeding, but held that statements made during these proceedings 
could not be used against a defendant in subsequent criminal proceed­
ings. 307 The court also found there was sufficient evidence to find beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Allen had a propensity to commit sexual as­
sault. 308 Allen appealed to the United States Supreme Court, arguing 
that the commitment hearing was a criminal proceeding and, therefore, 
that he was entitled to full criminal procedural protections. 309 
299. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, para. 105-1.01 (1985) (quoted in Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. at 366 . 
n.1) defines sexually dangerous persons as follows: 
"All persons suffering from a mental disorder, which mental disorder has ex­
isted for a period of not less than one year, immediately prior to the filing of the 
petition hereinafter provided for, coupled with criminal propensities to the commis­
sion of sex offenses, and who have demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual 
assault or acts of sexual molestation of children, are hereby declared sexually danger­
ous persons." 
300. People v. Allen, 481 N.E.2d at 692-93. 
301. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. at 372. 
302. People v. Allen, 481 N.E.2d at 692. 
303. 62 Ill.2d 3 17, 342 N.E.2d 28 (1976). 
304. 3 1  Ill.2d 301, 201 N.E. 455 (1964). 
305. People v. Allen, 48 1 N.E.2d at 695. 
306. Id. at 696. 
307. Id. 
308. Id. at 697. 
309. Defendant's basic theory was, "Ifit walks like a duck . . . .  " The state provided some, 
but not all, criminal procedures; the result of the proceeding was that defendant was sent to a 
maximum security prison. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. at 370; see also id. at 377-79 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
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As a prevention case, the critical issue in Allen is the extent to which 
the State has authority to restrict individual liberty without triggering 
criminal law protections. The Allen Court recited the rule that legislative 
labeling of a statute as civil is not dispositive.3e10 However, the rationale 
of Allen expanded the state's discretion to fashion civil remedies for what 
traditionally have been considered criminal wrongs; the increased discre­
tion follows from the Court's rejection of defendant's contention that In 
re Gault prevented him being deprived of liberty without being afforded 
the privilege against self-incrimination.31e1 This ruling allowed Illinois to 
incarcerate a technically innocent, mentally competent individual with­
out full criminal law protections. The Court made clear in its rejection of 
Gault that Illinois' characterization of the statute as potentially benefit­
ting the defendant was crucial. The Illinois law escaped criminal law 
scrutiny simply because the legislature denied that it intended to punish 
confinees. 
Allen explicitly overruled Gault to the extent that Gault had pur-
ported to govern every deprivation of liberty: 
First, Gault's sweeping statement that "our Constitution guaran­
tees that no person shall be 'compelled' to be a witness against him­
self when he is threatened with deprivation of his liberty," is 
plainly not good law. Although the fact that incarceration may re­
sult is relevant to the question whether the privilege against self­
incrimination applies, Addington demonstrates that involuntary 
commitment does not itself trigger the entire range of criminal pro­
cedural protections. 312 
The Court also found that the Illinois statute served a parens patriae 
role in providing treatment to mentally ill individuals.313 This treatment 
component defeated defendant's objection that the statute was wholely 
punitive. Although the treatment was carried out in a maximum-secur­
ity facility, the Court found that the confinement was not inconsistent 
with the statute's purpose, and noted further that states have the right to 
protect the community from persons who are dangerous due to mental 
310. The Illinois legislature expressly designated proceedings under the Act as civil in na-
ture. Discussing the effect of this designation, the Supreme Court stated: 
As a petitioner correctly points out, however, the civil label is not always dispositive. 
Where a defendant has provided "the clearest proof" that "the statutory scheme [is] 
so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention" that the 
proceeding be civil, it must be considered criminal and the privilege against self­
incrimination must be applied. 
Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. at 369 (citation omitted). 
3 1 1. Id. at 372. 
3 12. Id. at 372-73 (citation omitted). 
313. Id. at 373. 
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illness. 3e14 
The Allen Court emphasized that excessive reliance on criminal law 
protections, especially the privilege against self-incrimination, can reduce 
the accuracy of determinations of dangerousness.315 This focus reflects a 
shift from the criminal law perspective that the defendant is best off with 
a determination of innocence to the public health perspective that the 
defendant is better off being treated.31e6 Ultimately, the Court identified 
support for the statute's relaxed procedural requirements in the special 
role of the states in our federal system, concluding that the "essence of 
federalism is that states must be free to develop a variety of solutions to 
problems and not be forced into a common, uniform mold . . . .  "317 
The Court expands this notion of flexibility in the subsequent cases 
of Hilton v. Braunstill318 and United States v. Salerno.319 While Allen 
allowed Illinois to confine an individual without full due process protec­
tions, it was predicated on a determination beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant had committed a crime. In Hilton and Salerno, the 
Court found that adults could be confined to prevent future harm without 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that they had committed crimes in the 
past. 
6. Hilton v. Braunskill 
In the 1987 Term, the Supreme Court solidified its jurisprudence of 
prevention in the companion cases of United States v. Salerno320 and 
Hilton v. Braunskill, 321 two cases that knit together a body of decisions 
heretofore regarded as unrelated exceptions to due process require­
ments. 322 In these cases, the Court extended the concept of regulatory 
314. Id. (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 426). 
315. The Court's analysis of the value of the privilege against self-incrimination was in the 
context of distinguishing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), which dealt with the 
application of the privilege in a property deprivation case: 
As the Supreme Court of Illinois and the State have both pointed out, it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to see how requiring the privilege against self-incrimination in these 
proceedings would in any way advance reliability. Indeed, the State takes the quite 
plausible view that denying the evaluating psychiatrist the opportunity to question 
persons alleged to be sexually dangerous would decrease the reliability of a finding of 
sexual dangerousness. As in Addington, "to adopt the criminal law standard gives no 
assurance" that States will reach a "better" result. 
Id. at 374-75. 
3 1 6. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. at 375. 
317. Id. at 375 (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 431). 
3 18. 107 S. Ct. 2113  (1987). See infra subsection 6. 
319. 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987). See infra subsection 7. 
320. 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987). 
321. 107 S. Ct. 21 13  (1987). 
322. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2102. 
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detention well into traditional criminal law jurisprudence. The Court 
based this extension on the right of societal self-defense that underlies the 
jurisprudence of preventfon. 
Braunskill, the more narrowly decided of these two cases, involved a 
habeas corpus petition by a state prisoner. 323 Dana Braunskill was con­
victed of first-degree sexual assault and fourth-degree unlawful posses­
sion of a knife. 324 At trial, the judge refused to allow an alibi witness' 
testimony, which Braunskill alleged would have refuted testimony plac­
ing him at the scene of the crime. The New Jersey Court of Appeals 
found that the alibi witness had been improperly excluded, 325 but that 
the testimony was of 'dubious value'; the appeals court was satisfied "be­
yond a reasonable doubt that any such error did not affect the ver­
dict. "326 Braunskill filed his petition for habeas corpus pro se327 from 
within the New Jersey State Prison. Upon granting the petition for 
habeas corpus, the federal district court did not order the petitioner's re­
lease, but stayed the issuance of the writ for 30 days to allow the state 
time to retry the petitioner. 328 The state asked the district court to sus­
pend its order pending appeal of the case, alleging that Braunskill was a 
potential threat to the community. 329 The court denied the motion, find­
ing that the only acceptable ground for detaining Braunskill would be the 
risk that he would not appear for subsequent proceedings. 330 The state 
then sought a stay of the court's order from the United States court of 
appeals. The appeals court "summarily denied the stay application."331 
Reversing the court of appeals, the United States Supreme Court 
determined that the proper standard for reviewing a motion to stay a writ 
of habeas corpus are the same as those for reviewing a civil judgment, 
More 
lies."333 
because habeas corpus proceedings are civil, not criminal, in nature. 332 
specifically, a court must consider "where the public interest 
The Court found that considering whether releasing a habeas 
corpus petitioner might endanger the community was in the public inter-
323. 629 F.Supp. 5 1 1  (D.N.J. 1986). 
324. Id. at 513. 
325. Id. at 515. 
326. Id. at 516  (citation omitted). 
327. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 
328. Braunski/l, 629 F.Supp. at 526. 
329. Hilton, 107 S. Ct. at 21e17. 
330. Id. 
331. Id., citing Carter v. Rafferty, 781 F.2d. 993, 997 (3d Cir. 1986). 
_ 332. Id. at 21 18. Therefore the general standards governing stays of civil judgments should 
also guide courts when they decide whether to release a habeas corpus petitioner pending the 
state's appeal. Id. at 21e19. 
333. Id. at 21 19. 
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est. 334 The Court rejected the argument that substantive due process 
"prohibits the total deprivation of liberty simply as a means of preventing 
future crimes."335 
Detaining an individual in order to prevent future criminal behavior 
harkens back to the idea that moral contagion is a public health issue. 336 
By implicitly applying the public health metaphor to crime, the Court 
avoided applying the cumbersome constitutional protections that pertain 
in a criminal context. Hilton weakened the presumption of innocence 
through the facile observation that persons who have been convicted of a 
crime are less likely to be innocent than persons not convicted of a 
crime.337 
Although the Hilton court acknowledged that the foundation of a 
successful habeas corpus petition is a finding that the underlying convic­
tion was constitutionally infirm, 338 the Court stressed that a prisoner is 
entitled to less protection than an arrestee or a randomly chosen citizen 
because the prisoner has already been found guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt by a jury.339 � 
However, this holding is not in keeping with the notion that inno­
cence is an absolute quality: either o�e is innocent or one is not inno­
cent. 340 By quantifying innocence so that it may be set off against 
dangerousness, the Court transformed the absolutist issue of constitu-
334. "[I]f the state establishes that there is a risk that the prisoner will pose a danger to the 
public if released, the court may take that factor into consideration in determining whether to ' 
enlarge him." Id. 
335. Id. at 2120. 
· 336. The Supreme Court, in Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540 (1840), stated: 
No political community, no municipal corporation, can be under any obligation to 
suffer a moral pestilence to pollute its air, or contagion, of the most corrupting and 
demoralizing influence, to spread among its citizens, by the conduct and example of 
men, who, having forfeited the protection of their own government by their crimes, 
claim to be rescued from the consequences, by an appeal to the same Constitution 
and laws, under which our own citizens are not, and cannot be screened from pun­
ishment, when it is merited by their conduct." 
Id. at 615-16. 
337. When combined with the holding in Bell, which limits the presumption of innocence 
to criminal trials, this ruling severely constrains the presumption of innocence as a viable legal 
theory. 
338. Hilton, 107 S. Ct. at 2120. 
339. But we also think that a successful habeas petitioner is in a considerably less 
favorable position than a pre-trial arrestee . • .  to challenge his continued detention 
pending appeal. Unlike a pre-trial arrestee, a state habeas petitioner has been ad­
judged guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by a judge or jury, and this adjudication of 
guilt has been upheld by the appellate courts of the state. 
Id. 
340. The Supreme Court foreshadowed this relativistic view of innocence with its decision 
in Bell that innocent pretrial detainees are not entitled to special status. See supra note 188-92 ' 
and accompanying text. 
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tionally impermissible punishment of an innocent person into the proba­
bilistic issue of dangerousness. Once we contemplate judicial balancing 
of the pain of detention against the safety of society, then detention of 
innocent persons is no longer unthinkable. Ultimately the due process 
issues become subsumed within a determination of dangerousness. 
In a federal habeas corpus action, the judge makes the determination 
of dangerousness. Because federal rules governing habeas corpus derive 
from the court's equity powers, 341 the federal judge has broad discretion 
to make the determination. Despite serious risk of unconstitutional 
vagueness, 342 the Supreme Court accepts this procedure recognizing that 
the public interest requires that the determination be flexible. However, 
this procedure is arguably inconsistent with the criminal law doctrine 
that bars punishment under ambiguous statutes.343 
7. United States v. Salemo344 
U.S. v. Salerno represen"t:s the most recent refinement of the regula­
tory /punitive dichotomy: the civil detention of adults to prevent future 
criminal conduct. Commentators have assailed this decision as an ero­
sion of criminal defendants' rights. 345 More importantly, the Supreme 
Court's decision in Salerno may signal an effort to revive a set of previ­
ously unrelated civil restriction cases as precedent for the jurisprudence 
of prevention. 
The district court in U.S. v. Salerno reviewed the indictment of 
Anthony "Fat Tony" Salerno. 346 Salerno was indicted under the Rack­
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RIC0)347 for conspir­
ing to engage in a pattern of racketeering. 348 Pursuant to the Bail 
Reform Act of 1984,349 which allows bail to be denied to persons who 
pose a threat of future criminal activity, the government moved to have 
Salerno detained prior to trial. Conceding that he posed no risk of flight, 
the government nevertheless maintained that he posed a threat to the 
community and "that no condition or combination of conditions will as-
341. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc 62(c) and Fed. Rule App. Proc. 8(a), cited in Hilton at 2 1 19. 
342. "Since the traditional stay factors contemplate individualized judgments in each case, 
the formula cannot be reduced to a rigid set of rules." Id. at 21 19. 
343. See, e.g., Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344, 353 (1959) (sending convicted person to jail 
for crime "he could not with reasonable certainty know he was committing" violates funda­
mental fairness"). 
344. 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987). 
345. See infra note 405. 
346. United States v. Salerno, 631 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
347. 1 8  u.s.c. § 1962. 
348. Salerno, 631 F. Supp. at 1366-67. 
349. 18  U.S.C. § 3142(f)(l)(A) (1984). 
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sure the safety of the community or of any person . . . .  "350 The district 
court conducted a hearing at which Salerno, represented by counsel, was 
allowed to offer testimony rebutting the government's allegations. Sa­
lerno was not, however, allowed to cross-examine or confront the gov­
ernment's witnesses. 351 
In deviating from the usual form of an adversarial hearing, 352 the 
court stated that a pretrial detention hearing is civil, rather than criminal 
in nature. 353 It characterized the proceeding as one involving involun­
tary civil commitment, subject to the reduced standard of proof estab­
lished in Addington v. Texas.354 By this characterization, the District 
Court was able to avoid the issue of Salerno's presumed innocence and 
indulge in a risk calculus based on the government's evidence that Sa­
lerno ran a criminal enterprise. 
The government presented extensive evidence that Salerno posed a 
danger to the community. 355 This evidence consisted of allegations of 
past criminal activities and the assertion that Salerno had the power to 
direct murder with no more than a word. 356 Within the constraints of 
the limited adversary hearing given Salerno, the court found that "the 
government has established by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant . . e. pose[s] a present danger to the community and that no 
condition or combination of conditions of release will reasonably assure 
the safety of any other person and the community."357 Concluding that 
350. Salerno, 631 F. Supp. at 1366. 
351. The government was concerned that Salerno would kill or intimidate the witnesses if 
he was allowed to confront them: 
The government has a substantial interest at this early stage of the case in 
preventing premature discovery, in protecting the emotional and physical well-being 
of its witnesses and in preventing impairment of on-going investigations. On the 
record of this case, the court finds that these interests outweigh any prejudice 
claimed by Salerno in not being able to directly impeach Fratianno and Lonardo. 
Id. at 1373. Central to the court's accepting the government's request to shelter its witnesses 
was the testimony on Salerno's involvement with various conspiracies to commit murder. See 
id. at 1367-68. 
352. Id. at 1373. 
353. Moreover, the court pointed out, "At a pretrial detention hearing, many of the rights 
a defendant enjoys at a criminal trial are absent. The detention hearing is not punitive in 
nature; rather, it is an involuntary civil commitment proceeding at which proof by a standard 
less than 'beyond a reasonable doubt' is applicable." Id. at 1373. 
354. Id. (citing Addington, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)). 
355. "The court has received a great deal of information about Salerno's danger to the 
community; it is overwhelming. By 'clear and convincing' proof, the government has estab­
lished that Salerno is the head, or 'Boss', of an organization engaged in extortion, loanshark­
ing, illegal gambling, and murder." Id. at 1371. 
356. "The government has proffered information showing that Salerno could order a mur­
der merely by voicing his assent with the single word 'hit.' " Id. at 1371. 
357. Id. at 1366. 
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the government had satisfied the statutory test to justify detention pursu­
ant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984,358 the district court ordered Sa­
lerno's detention. 359 
Salerno appealed his pretrial detention to the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals, 360 challenging both the sufficiency of the evidence of future 
dangerousness and the constirutionality of the Bail Reform Act. 361 The 
appeals court did not find that the district court's limitations on the ad­
versary hearing prejudiced Salerno's rights, nor did it contest the use of a 
"clear and convincing" standard (rather than "beyond a reasonable 
doubt") to justify detention. 362 The court also held that the conditions of 
the proposed detention itself were proper. 363 
After rejecting Solerno's procedural objections, the appeals court 
addressed the constitutional issue of detention based on future danger­
ousness. The court declined to characterize detention as regulatory 
rather than punitive in nature: 
The sole bases for the detention order in this case are the findings 
that the defendants would, if released, carry on "business as usual" 
notwithstanding any release conditions, and that business as usual 
involves threats and crimes of violence. We regard section 
3142(e)'s authorization of pretrial detention on this ground as re­
pugnant to the concept of substantive due process, which we be­
lieve prohibits the total deprivation of liberty simply as a means of 
preventing future crimes. 364 
358. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-56 (Supp. II 1984). 
359. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT defendants Salerno and Cafaro be commit­
ted to the custody of the Attorney General for confinement in a corrections facility 
. . . and that, on an order of a court of the United States or on the request of an 
attorney for the government, the person in charge of the corrections facility in which 
they are confined deliver them to a United States marshal for the purpose of an 
· appearance in connection with a court proceeding. 
U.S. v. Salerno, 631 F. Supp. at 1375. 
360. United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Salerno (2d Cir.)]. 
361. Id. at 68. 
362. Id. at 70. 
363. Id. at 71.  
364. The court in Salerno at 71-72 (quoting from United States v.  Melendez-Carrion, 790 
F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1 986)), pointed out: 
The Government contends that section 3142(e) [the Bail Reform Act] is to be upheld 
simply because preventive detention is a rational means of advancing the compelling 
state interest in public safety. That cannot be the test for determining the constitu­
tionality of preventive detention. The fallacy of using such a test can be readily seen 
from consideration of preventive detention as applied to persons not arrested for any. 
offense. It cannot seriously be maintained that under our Constitution the Govern­
ment could jail people not accused of any crime simply because they were thought 
likely to commit crimes in the future. Yet such a police state approach would un­
doubtedly be a rational means of advancing the compelling state interest in public 
safety. In a constitutional system where liberty is protected both substantively and 
procedurally by the limitations of the Due Process Clause, a total deprivation of 
liberty cannot validly be accomplished [on the sole ground that] doing so is a rational 
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Pretrial detention is inconsistent with the traditional view that liberty is 
an absolute constitutional value, yet, the appeals court did not take a 
pure absolutist position in reviewing the use of pretrial detention365 For 
example, the court proposed the use of surveillance as an alternative to 
incarceration to prevent a monstrous crime, such as the threatened de­
struction of an airliner. 366 In suggesting this unpalatable alternative to 
pretrial detention, the appeals court implicitly recognized that the doc­
trine of absolute liberty until a final criminal conviction has unacceptable 
societal implications. 
The appeals court carefully distinguished Gerstein v. Pugh367 as lim­
ited to administrative steps incident to arrest. 368 The court refused to 
make Gerstein, which it characterized as a decision rendered to protect 
suspects, "the basis for extending that detention for weeks and months 
after the probable cause determination ha[d] been made."369 The court 
was also careful to limit the ruling in Schall v. Martin370 to juveniles. 
Conceding that adults may pose as great a threat to society as juveniles, 
the Salerno court interpreted Schall as "at pains to point out" that 
juveniles are always in some form of custody. 371 Both of these finely 
drawn distinctions were swept away in the Supreme Court's reversal of 
Salerno. 
Justice Rehnquist set the stage for the Supreme Court opinion in 
Salerno by reviewing the legislative history of the Bail Reform Act. The 
Court found that the Act was passed in response to "the alarming prob­
lem of crimes committed by persons on release," and that it gave courts 
"adequate authority to make release decisions that give appropriate rec-
means of regulating to promote .even a substantial governmental interest. (emphasis 
· added in Salerno (2d Cir.). 
365. The appeals court also suggested that if a crime is sufficiently heinous, then the Gov­
ernment need merely assert that it fears the suspected criminal will flee. Id. at 74. This leaves 
the question whether it is constitutionally preferable to detain on the acceptable but sham 
ground of fear of flight. 
366. "Even the risk of some serious crime . . .  must, under our Constitution, be guarded 
against by surveillance of the suspect and prompt trial on any pending charges, and not by 
incarceration . . . .  " Id. at 74. 
367. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). 
368. "We do not believe that Gerstein v. Pugh upholds pretrial detention to guard against 
the commission of future crimes. The detention there allowed, upon a policeman's assessment 
of probable cause, was for the purpose of taking 'the administrative steps incident to arrest.' " 
Salerno (2d Cir.) at 74 (citations omitted). 
369. Id. 
370. 467 U.S. 253 (19'84). 
371 .  Salerno (2d Cir.) at 74. The appeals court also stressed that Schall represents the state 
exercisingeparens patriae power to protect the juvenile, rather than focusing on Schall as exer­
cising the authority to protect the pµblic. 
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ognition to the danger a person may pose to others if released."372 In 
recognizing that the threat of public danger requires courts to exercise 
increased discretionary authority, the Supreme Court invoked public 
health jurisprudence to shift the constitutional question from criminal to 
civil law antecedents. 
The key to this transformation is a recharacterization of "impermis­
sible punishment" as "permissible regulation," based on Bell v. Wolf­
ish373 and Schall. 374 Both Bell and Schall involved situations in which 
the effect of a statute was to confine "innocent" persons to unpleasant 
places. In Schall, the Supreme Court accepted that detention of juveniles 
did not constitute punishment. 375 Bell involved adult pretrial detainees 
who were confined in a crowded federal detention center; the Bell Court 
found that this admittedly unpleasant confinement was not punishment 
because it was reasonably related to a legitimate government objective. 376 
Following these holdings, the Salerno court found: 
As an initial matter, the mere fact that a person is detained does 
not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has im­
posed punishment. To determine whether a restriction on liberty 
constitutes impermissible punishment or permissible regulation, we 
first look to the legislative intent. Unless Congress expressly in­
tended to impose punitive restrictions, the punitive/regulatory dis­
tinction turns on, " 'whether an alternative purpose to which [the 
restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and 
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose 
assigned [to it].' "377 
Examining the legislative history of the Bail Reform Act, the 
Supreme Court determined that Congress intended pretrial detention to 
protect the public and not to punish. 378 The Court concluded that pre­
trial detention pursuant to the Bail Reform Act is "regulatory in nature, 
and does not constitute punishment before trial in violation of the Due 
Process Clause."379 
372. U.S. v. Salemo, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2098 (1987) (citing S. REP. No. 98-225, p. 3, U.S. 
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1984, p. 31  85). 
373. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
374. 467 U.S. 253. By contrast, in Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), an immigra­
tion law punished persons who left the United States to evade the draft. In that case, the 
apparent purpose of the statute (punishment) was also the intended purpose. Id. at 169. 
375. Schall, 467 U.S. at 269. 
376. Bell, 441 U.S. at 539. 
377. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2101 (citations omitted). 
378. "Congress did not formulate the pretrial detention provisions as punishment for dan­
gerous individuals. Congress instead perceived pretrial detention as a potential solution to a 
pressing societal problem. There is no doubt that preventing danger to the community is a 
legitimate regulatory goal." Id. (citations omitted). 
379. Id. at 2101. 
Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) and Wing Wong v. 
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More generally, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the Due 
Process Clause is an "impenetrable wall". 380 The Court recited a litany 
of cases in which states subrogated the liberty of individuals to the pro­
tection of society. 381 The Court stressed that, although those instances 
may all be considered "exceptions" to the "general rule" that the govern­
ment may not detain a person prior to a judgment of guilt in criminal 
trial, the rule is by now so riddled with exceptions as to be ineffective in 
limiting the government's authority to restrain individuals. 382 Character­
izing these cases as supportive of the government's right to infringe lib­
erty for the public good, the Supreme Court implicitly reaffirmed the 
right of the government to detain: 1) "in times of war or insurrection 
. . . individuals whom the government believes to be dangerous";383 
2) "potentially dangerous" resident aliens pending deportation hear­
ing;384 3) "mentally unstable individuals who present a danger to the 
public";385 4) "dangerous defendants who become incompetent to stand 
trial";386 5) "juveniles when they present a continuing danger to the 
community";387 and 6) persons arrested on suspicion of committing a 
crime.388 
In reviewing the facial challenge to the Bail Reform Act the Court 
stressed that it was construing a statute that contained a detailed proce­
dure for assuring the protection of the defendant's rights. 389 The Court 
emphasized that the Bail Reform Act provides more due process protec­
tion than many other cases; in particular, the Supreme Court contrasted 
the provisions of the Bail Reform Act with the statute that was upheld in 
380. Id. 
381. Id. 
382. Id. at 2102. 
383. Id. It is interesting that the Court cited Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948), a 
case allowing the detention of an enemy alien, and Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909), 
rather than the more notorious Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
384. Salerno at 2102 (citing carlson v. 
United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896)). 
385. Salerno at 2102 (citing Addington, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)). 
386. Salerno at 2102 (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) and Greenwood v. 
United States, 350 U.S. 366 (1956)). 
387. Salerno at 2102 (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. at 269). 
388. Salerno at 2102 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)). 
389. The government must first of all demonstrate probable cause to believe that the 
charged crime has been committed by the arrestee, but that is not enough. In a full­
blown adversary hearing, the government must convince a neutral decisionmaker by 
clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure 
that safety of the community or any person. 
Id. at 2103. 
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Schall v. Martin. 390 In rejecting the appeals court's limitation of Schall 
to the pretrial detention of juveniles, the Supreme Court may have fore­
seen a broader role for Schall as a standard for due process in adult 
detentions. 
Disposing of Salerno's challenge based on the Excessive Bail Clause 
of the Eighth Amendment, the Court dismissed the argument that the 
Constitution's· prohibition against excessive bail amounts to a require­
ment that bail always be provided. If there are considerations other than 
flight, the Court said, then the Excessive Bail Clause does not require 
release on bail.391 
Disposing of Salerno's piea for freedom; the Court carefully charac­
terized its holding as an exception to the societal expectation of liberty. 
Although the Court reiterated that the Bail Reform Act included safe­
guards that enabled it to pass constitutional scrutiny, the Court empha­
sized that liberty is not absolute, but must be balanced against the 
"primary concern of every government-a concern for the safety and 
indeed the lives of its citizens . . . . "392 
III. Reconciling Traditional Public Health Jurisprudence and 
the Jurisprudence of Prevention 
For the past generation, civil rights activists have pushed the courts 
to apply ever more rigorous standards to criminal prosecutions. At the 
same time, conservatives have pushed the courts to give the states more 
authority to contain crime, drugs, and degeneracy. The collision of these 
political agendas has resulted in the jurisprudence of prevention: courts 
have preserved the protections of criminal law, but have also given states 
the authority to avoid some of these protections through civil detentions. 
In the prevention cases, the Supreme Court has transformed the 
traditional police power to restrict disease carriers into a general power 
to restrict individuals whose criminal activity poses a threat to society.393 
In its infancy, prevention jurisprudence was merely an ad hoc approach 
390. "The protections are more exacting than those we found sufficient in the juvenile con­
text, see Schall, and they far exceed what we found necessary . . .  in Gerstein v. Pugh." Id. at 
2104 (citations omitted). 
391.  "We believe that when Congress has mandated detention on the basis of a compelling 
interest other than prevention of flight, as it has here, the Eighth Amendment does not require 
release on bail." Id. at 2105. 
392. Id. at 2105. 
393. This transformation mirrors the introduction of the doctrine of ferae naturae, that a 
wild animal belongs to the person who catches it, into modem oil and gas law. Oil and gas 
were once thought to run free underground. By analogy with the law applying to the capture 
of wild animals, it was decided that oil and gas belonged to whomever captured it. 
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that appeared in disparate cases. With Allen, 394 Hilton, 395 and Sa­
lerno, 396 it has moved into adolescence. Prevention jurisprudence is 
characterized by highly technical distinctions between punishment and 
regulation, 397 meticulous attention to requiring only the bare minimum 
of procedural due process, 398 and the granting of broad authority to deci­
sion makers. 399 These characteristics mirror traditional public health 
authority. 
In the public health model, the decisionmaker is the public health 
official; the standard for tQ.e decision is reasonable medical probability; 
the individual is treated, and released after the danger of communicabil­
ity has passed; and the health department is concerned only with future 
acts.400 This model works very well for gonorrhea.401 It is potentially 
most restrictive in the case of pan-drug-resistant tuberculosis.402 Most 
public outcry over the traditional public health model has surrounded 
HIV I AIDS because the untreatability and inevitable fatality of the dis­
ease could be called on to justify the use of such Draconian measures 
such as indefinite confinement. 403 The jurisprudence of prevention repre­
sents legislative and judicial reaction to the real and perceived dangers in 
394. See supra Part II, Section B, subsection 5. 
395. See supra Part II, Section B, subsection 6. 
396. See supra Part II, Section B, subsection 7. 
397. Bell, 441 U.S. at 560-62; Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2101; Allen, 478 U.S. at 370. See supra 
note 190 and accompanying text. 
398. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
399. Schall 467 U.S. at 278-281. See supra note 283 and accompanying text. 
400. This model does not involve judicial hearings except as necessary to obtain police 
cooperation in apprehending a recalcitrant disease carrier. If a person is unjustly confined, the 
only recourse is a habeas corpus petition. 
401. In this context, "working well" reflects that disease carriers are rapidly treated and 
returned to the community. The ease and speed of treatment reduces the necessary restriction 
of individual liberty to a minimum. "Working well" is harder to evaluate in the face of 3 
million cases of gonorrhea a year. See HETHCOTE, supra note 90 at 1 .  
402. Once a person becomes symptomatic with tuberculosis he may die unless he is 
provided prolonged treatment with antituberculosis drugs. It is a difficult disease to 
treat and requires treatment with somewhat toxic drugs for several months. In some 
cases, the bacillus becomes resistant to the drugs and thus becomes untreatable. Pa­
tients with infectious, drug resistent tuberculosis pose a particular problem because 
some of the persons that they infect will also develop drug resistent tuberculosis. 
Pan-drug resistent tuberculosis is frequently fatal in adults and children, despite all 
available treatments. 
Richards, supra note 1,  at 149; see also B. KETCHER, L. youNG, & M. KODA-KIMBEL, AP­
PLIED THERAPEUTICS: THE CLINICAL USE OF DRUGS 682 (1983). 
403. [T]he point of mandatory AIDS antibody testing is the degradation of gays and 
the reconsecration of heterosexual supremacy as a sacred value, even though 
mandatory testing, to date, has not been directly aimed at gays nor, indeed, has made 
any mention of them. AIDS-testing legislation is not to be understood as business­
as-usual public policy-making aimed at maximizing overall social utility or realizing 
public goods-it can adequately be understood only in terms of the nature and func­
tion of social rituals, in particular, purification rituals. 
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American society. The fear is that courts will use the jurisprudence of 
prevention to impose punishment without affording the procedural pro­
tections that the Constitution requires in a criminal context. 
The fear that traditional public health authority will be used for sin­' ister ends is exacerbated by the prevention cases. All such rulings have 
been controversial, drawing fire from dissenting justices404 and from 
scholarly commentators.405 Rather than recognizing the pattern that is 
emerging from these isolated cases, however, the critics have focused on 
the arbitrariness of the Supreme Court's actions. 
A. The Punishment-Oriented Prevention Model 
From an individual rights perspective, the most troubling scenario is 
the evolution of a model that uses public health and safety rhetoric to 
justify procedures that are, in essence, punishment and detention.406 In 
this model, judges would have regulatory decisionmaking authority lim­
ited only by legislative exhortations to protect society. The potential 
consequence for a potentially dangerous individual would be indetermi­
nate detention, indistinguishable from punitive imprisonment. 407 Pro­
ceedings would be carried out expeditiously affording defendants only 
limited procedural protections. The detained individual could appeal the 
adjudication only through habeas corpus proceedings. Under this scena­
rio, a prosecutor could obtain detention through careful adherence to the 
ritualistic formulation of appropriate standards of proof, yet with proof 
devoid of substance.408 
Mohr, Policy, Ritual, Purity: Gays and Mandatory AIDS Testing, 15 L., MED. & HEALTH 
CARE 178 (1987). 
404. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 375 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
405. See Constitutional Law-Criminal Law and Procedure: Pretrial Detention-Bail Re­
form Act of 1984, 101 HARV. L. REV. 169, 179 (1987). This article is illustrative because it 
recognizes the difficult problem posed by defendants such as Salemo who are willing to kill to 
avoid prosecution. It does not, however, accept that this real danger justifies beggaring the 
presumption of innocence. While this is an admirable position from an individual rights per­
spective, it oversimplifies the role of the Court in preserving societal harmony. For a non­
judgmental discussion of the impact of the decision and its potential mitigation through pre­
trial services, see Wanger, Limiting Preventive Detention Through Conditional Release: The 
Unfulfilled Promise of the 1982 Pretrial Services Act, 97 YALE L.J. 320 (1987). 
406. See Garbus, Detention U.S.A. , THE NATION, Jan. 30, 1988 at 1 13. 
Recently, Judge Vladimir Terebilov, the Soviet Union's highest ranking judge, called 
for limiting pretrial detention to a maximum of six months. This reform, if enacted, 
would place the Soviet Union far ahead of the United States and in line with the 
more enlightened criminal jurisdictions of the world. The United States is one of the 
few large countries (the others are Chile and South Africa) that permit indeterminate 
detention of people not convicted of a crime, thanks to the Bail Reform Act of 1984. 
407. Since this is not a criminal model, individuals will not be criminally accused, but only 
identified as having an arbitrary probability of causing trouble in society. 
408. See supra text accompanying note 234. 
HeinOnline -- 16 Hastings Const. L.Q. 386 1988-1989 
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Although this model seems an unthinkable Or\vellian scenario, it 
holds certain attractions. Our society is being torn apart by fears of ur­
ban violence, hysteria surrounding the use of drugs, and fears generated 
by the criminal justice system's failure to adequately respond to these 
problems. If future Supreme Court decisions do not vere from its juris­
prudence of prevention, traditional criminal jurisprudence will gradually 
be supplanted in many areas. To preserve individual rights, courts 
should adopt a risk-analysis approach to the jurisprudence of prevention, 
rather than a punishment model. 
B. A Risk Analysis Basis for the Jurisprudence of Prevention 
A risk-analysis jurisprudence concedes that there are special cases in 
which the need to protect society outweighs an individual's right to tradi­
tional constitutional protections.409 Although courts have always recog­
nized that there are exceptions to constitutional protections,410 there has 
not been a rigorous effort to define the conditions that trigger an excep­
tion. This tension is very apparent in Schall and Barefoot, in which it 
was argued that the methodologies used to predict future dangerousness 
were so flawed as to be meaningless.41 1  The Supreme Court only in­
creased this tension by rejecting substantive due process arguments out 
of hand, relying on the adversarial process to "sort the wheat from the 
chaff". 412 
If the prevention cases share a common jurisprudential basis with 
traditional public health cases, they also share an analogous risk 
calculus. The parameters used to determine the risk of a communicable 
disease may be transformed into a formulation for ascertaining a de­
tainee's risk of future dangerousness. If we call the risk factor for a com­
municable disease (R), then (R) is determined by the severity (S) of the 
disease, its transmissibility (T), and the number of persons at risk (P): 
(R) (S)(T)(P). Severity is a complex term that integrates the duration = 
409. The notion of "traditional" constitutional protection is, of course, a fairly slippery 
concept. Most criminal law constitutional protections are of recent origin, as are civil rights 
protections. It might be argued that the line between traditional protections and the historical 
lack of constitutional protections from state imposed restrictions lies somewhere between 1945 
and 1960. 
410. See, e.g. ,  Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868) (war and insurrection); Carlson v. 
Landson, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (immigration and naturalization); Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (detention of American citizens of Japanese ancestry during wartime 
upheld). 
411 .  See also Schall, 513 F. Supp. at 707; Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896-97. Subsequent re­
search on the 3 1  named defendants in Schall determined that the 24 who could be located had 
continued to engage in criminal activities. See KRAMER, AT A TENDER AGE 242 (1988). 
412. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 901 n.7. 
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of the disease with the mortality and morbidity.413 Transmissibility is a 
measure of the ease with which the disease may spread from individual to 
individual. Transmissibility varies greatly for different diseases.414 The 
population at risk is determined by individual susceptibility, patterns of 
high risk behavior, and demographic415 and geographic constraints on 
transmission. 
The higher (R), the greater the threat to citizens and to the stability 
of the community. In a constitutional context, the balance between indi­
vidual liberty interests and societal protection will shift away from indi­
vidual rights with increasing (R). When (R) is very low, such as for the 
common cold, there is no rational relationship between detention or 
other intrusive measures and disease control. When (R) is very high, as 
for pan-drug-resistant tuberculosis, then the rationale for intrusive state 
action,416 including permanent isolation, is compelling.417 
413. For example, the common cold is a disease with a very low severity because it has a 
short duration, causes only moderate discomfort and has a very low mortality. HIV infection 
is a very severe disease because it is untreatable, its duration is not self-limited and it causes 
significant morbidity and ultimately death in all infected persons. The severity of tuberculosis 
varies depending on the susceptibility of the organism to the available treatments and the 
resistance of the patient to the disease. Most cases of tuberculosis are treatable and cause only 
limited symptoms. There are strains of tuberculosis that are resistant to all available anti­
tubercular drugs. These strains cause a disease that is disabling and frequently fatal. 
414. For example, the common cold is highly infectious and is spread through respiratory 
secretions. This results in a highly transmissible disease. Gonorrhea is highly infectious, but is 
only spread through sexual contact. Thus, gonorrhea is less transmissible than a cold but is 
still sufficiently transmissible to have an incidence of 3 million cases a year. Tuberculosis is 
spread through respiratory secretions but, unlike cold and gonorrhea, is not highly contagious. 
Leprosy is extremely difficult to transmit, requiring both close personal contact with an in­
fected person and a �efective immune system. 
415. Gonorrhea is a demographically determined disease because it is confined to persons 
who are sexually active. 
416. This is implicitly limited to the universe of actions that have medical rationales. It 
would not include punitive measures such as forced labor or torture. 
417. As diseases such as HIV bring public health issues before the courts again, it should 
be possible systematically to evaluate proposed restrictions by following this risk calculus. 
Following this form, a public health risk brief should include: 
1) an analysis of the severity of the disease, including its treatability, mortality, mor­
bidity, and special factors (e.g., whether the disease causes a congenital syndrome in 
the children of infected pregnant women) that would influence a risk assessment; 
2) an analysis of the transmissibility of the disease, including the component of vol­
untary action involved in transmission and the probability of an effective contact (i.e., 
a contact that transmits the disease) during various activities; 
3) a description of the population at risk, including both its demographics (i.e., the 
number of persons at risk and their identifying characteristics, such as age, sex, 
ethnicity, etc.) and special characteristics of subpopulations at risk. 
This format would aid public health officials in evaluating the constitutionality of pro­
posed disease control measures. It would also allow courts to better separate factual medical 
issues from political and policy issues. For example, Utah and California might agree on the 
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A parallel risk analysis in prevention cases might allow a rigorous 
evaluation of individual detentions, focusing on factors similar to those 
relevant to traditional public health risk analysis: 
1) the threat to society posed by the behavior in question;418 
2) the probability that the defendant would engage in the danger­
ous behavior;419 
3) the number of persons at risk of engaging in the dangerous 
behavior. 420 
The resulting risk calculus might have factors of (R) for the risk to 
society, (T) for the threat posed by the activity under consideration, (D) 
for the probability of dangerousness, and (N) for the number of possible 
offenders: (R) (T)(D)(N). = 
The greater (R), the greater the state's right to protect itself from 
the activity in question. Protective measures would range from minimal 
regulation,421 to systematic regulation,422 to prohibition,423 to prospec­
tive actions to prevent possible future activity.424 More significantly, as 
(R) decreases, the importance of substantive due process increases. 425 
For example, in Salerno the Appeals Court postulated the 
threatened destruction of an airliner by terrorists.426 Intuitively, (R) 
would be very high for this scenario. The high risk involved would pro­
vide the state with a sufficient basis to detain the suspected terrorist with 
only summary proceedings. Given these factual assumptions, the risk of 
medical risk of gonorrhea, but disagree on the extent of individual restriction that the risk 
would justify. 
418. For example, a violent sexual offender would pose a greater risk than a chronic writer 
of hot checks. 
419. While this is certainly a difficult determination, there is evidence that for certain 
crimes, such as sexual abuse, offenders tend to be recidivists. See the excellent discussion of 
preventive detention in Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Dentention and the Failure of Interest­
Balancing Approach to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REv. 5 10, 537-51 (1986). 
420. This is the most constitutionally troubling criterion. But it is necessary if we are to 
pose rational solutions to problems that affect grossly different sized populations: one might 
"detain" every suspected psychopathic serial killer, but that remedy that would be unworkable 
for suspected illegal drug users. 
421. Publishing would fall into this category. The First Amendment embodies the idea 
that publishing is a benefit to society. The state is limited to prohibiting narrowly described 
activities such as child pornography. 
422. For example, the right to fly an airplane is heavily regulated because of the risk to 
society of incompetent pilots. 
423. This is the domain of criminal law. 
424. This is the traditional domain of public health jurisprudence. 
425. As Barefoot illustrates, due process and strict standards of proof offer scant protection 
when the underlying issue to .be proved is as insubstantial as an arbitrary probability of future 
dangerousness. 
426. Salerno, 794 F.2d at 74. 
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an improper detention would be outweighed by the risk of the airliner's 
destruction. 
Modifying the facts shifts the risks dr�matically. If the concern is 
that a student organization has been infiltrated by extremists who might 
incite the students to violent action, then (T) and (D) will be critical. 
Because the nature of the violent action is unknown, it will be difficult to 
determine its threat and thus (T) will be low. Since there is also great 
uncertainty about the probability of any action, (D) will be small. Thus, 
the risk associated with this activity is insignificant, (T)(D)(N) is small, 
and detention would require a heavy burden of proof. 
Although risk calculus is not meant to provide an algorithmic model 
for judging individual liberty deprivations, it is a useful tool for discuss­
ing prevention questions in a more rigorous manner than is allowed by 
traditional constitutional formulations. Because risk analysis splits com­
plex problems into simple components, a risk analysis may also help in 
the recognition of polycentric problems that defy single component 
solutions. 427 
Courts and legislatures have often based their actions on an implicit 
risk analysis.428 The problem with these implicit analyses is that their 
underlying assumptions are not open to scrutiny and challenge.429 An 
explicit analytical risk analysis is most sorely needed when courts and 
legislature attempt to make scientifically valid legal policy, because 
although scientific research can provide valuable insights on the nature of 
social problems, it seldom provides unambiguous answers that can be 
executed through statutory rules. A science-based legal policy must rely 
on expert decisionmakers to apply knowledge to specific factual situa­
tions; a legislatively or judicially imposed risk analysis would serve to 
427. The best example may be drug use. Drug laws treat opiates (heroin, morphine, 
codeine, etc.) the same way as stimulants (cocaine, amphetamine, etc.). Pharmacologically 
and psychologically they are profoundly different. Even a heavy opiate user can lead a produc­
tive life and not pose a threat to society. Opiate-associated crime is driven by the unavailabil­
ity of the drug, rather than the pharmacology of the drug. Conversely, heavy stimulant usage 
leads to an agitated, paranoid psychosis. This psychosis is incompatible with everyday respon­
sibilities and leads to antisocial actions, irrespective of access to the drug. By ignoring these 
differing risk profiles, the United States has allowed illegal drug usage to shift from potentially 
manageable substances to unmanageable stimulants. 
428. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 5 14 (1980). 
429. The Supreme Court used an implicit risk analysis in Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 
697 (1989) to extend the "plain view" exception of the Fourth Amendment to anything visible 
to a police officer in a helicopter. In his dissent, Justice Brennan criticized this implicit analy­
sis because it ignores the value of privacy to non-criminals: "By casting its "risk analysis" 
solely in terms of the expectations and risks that 'wrongdoers' or 'one contemplating illegal 
· activities' ought to bear, the plurality opinion, I think, misses the point entirely . . . .  " Id. at 
703 n.6. 
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limit the discretion of these experts.430 The alternative is to have jurors 
evaluate the expert's decisions based on no more than the personal credi­
bility of the expert. As illustrated in Barefoot, a "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard is little protection if the underlying substantive issue is 
improperly framed.431 
Explicit risk analysis may seem to undermine constitutional protec­
tions. Yet the Supreme Court has always balanced the individual's right 
to liberty against the state's right to protect itself. From the "clear and 
present danger" limitation on free speech, to restrictions on free exercise 
of religion by military personnel, the Court has shown time and again 
that there are no absolutely protected freedoms. Explicit risk analysis 
would give greater rigor to vague, legalistic formulations such as "strict 
scrutiny" and "reasonable relationship".  
The analogy between detention to prevent crime and isolation to 
control disease is not perfect, but the parallel is more than a surface re­
semblance. A systematic attempt should be made to apply risk analysis 
techniques that have been developed for disease spreading behavior to 
the larger universe of socially destructive behavior. Risk analysis would 
provide a basis for more humane imposition of individual restriction than 
is practiced by the Supreme Court today. 
Conclusions 
The right of self-defense is fundamental to the sovereignty of a state. 
From its earliest decisions, the Supreme Court has recognized that indi­
vidual liberty must be subrogated to the protection of the state. The 
clearest example of the subrogation of individual liberty to community 
welfare has been in the control of communicable diseases. 
For the first 150 years of the Republic, communicable diseases 
posed a great threat to society. Controlling communicable diseases re­
quired scientific and medical expertise, combined with the authority to 
impose coercive restrictions on infected individuals. The courts allowed 
public health officials to restrict an individual's liberty without prerestric­
tion due process protections when the purpose of the restriction was to 
430. In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 
U.S. 607 (1980), the Court invalidated OSHA's benzene regulations because they were not 
supported by a proper risk analysis as required by Congress. The Court usec! the requirement 
of a risk analysis to check the otherwise unlimited power of OSHA to promulgate workplace 
exposure standards. 448 U.S. at 653. 
43e1. See supra note 23 1 and accompanying text. Arguably, Texas capital murder defend­
ants would be better protected by a law that requires the expert to make specific findings on the 
probability of dangerousness (D) and the nature of that dangerousness (T). The jury would 
then determine if the product of these factors outweighed the value of the defendant's life. 
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protect the public and not to punish. While a restricted individual could 
petition for habeas corpus, the public health authority had only to prove 
a scientifically reasonable basis for the restrictions. There was no re­
quirement that restrictions be supported by proof "beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Despite an expansion of civil liberties in other aspects of life, the 
Supreme Court has never limited this broad grant of authority to public 
health officials. 
Even with the spectre of AIDS, contemporary societal fears revolve 
around crime, not communicable diseases. Correctly or incorrectly, leg­
islators perceive that full criminal law due process protections make con­
trolling crime more difficult. They have responded with laws that use 
civil restrictions, analogous to certain public health restrictions, to pre­
vent criminal activity. In a series of cases, discussed in this article as the 
prevention cases, the Supreme Court has upheld such laws. 
The prevention decisions narrow the constitutional protections 
available to persons accused of posing a threat to society. Based on an 
expert's determination of future dangerousness, individuals adjudged to 
be dangerous may be incarcerated without a determination of guilt. Be­
cause the Supreme Court decisions upholding these incarcerations use 
public health rationales, it is assumed that these cases also revitalize 
traditional public health precedents. The prevention decisions, combined 
with traditional public health authority, substantially erode the constitu­
tional protections available to persons who are accused of posing a threat 
to the state. It is proposed that these persons would be better protected if 
the courts and legislatures explicitly balanced the risk of harm against 
the individual's liberty interest. An explicit risk analysis would constrain 
the power of experts, and would facilitate community debate on the value 
of liberty in our society. Without a proper debate on these issues, we face 
ever more Draconian laws against politically unpopular behavior, while 
groups with political power will continue to escape effective regulation. 
